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Abstract  
 
Global consideration on money laundering has its origins in narco-trafficking of 1980s 
which raised public awareness and took international regulatory body’s attention. 
Throughout time, due to the socio-economic and political context, legislations on money 
laundering were transformed in order to introduce an efficient response to new issues. As 
a need in the aftermath of 9/11, counter-financing of terrorism (CFT) was included in the 
scope of anti-money laundering (AML) legislations, due to the intertwined nature of these 
two criminal matters. 
A new challenge to the AML/CFT legislations was introduced by the technological 
developments and the emergence of virtual currency. Appearing as an alternative, fast, 
easy and cheap non-cash payment method, its relation with criminal activities, 
widespread usage and unregulated operations raised concerns. When traditional 
approaches to the fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism were 
circumvented by pseudo-anonymous and decentralized nature of new transaction 
methods, existing legislations were forced to be transformed once more. 
European Union, taking its powers for regulating criminal matters from the Treaty of the 
Functioning of European Union (TFEU), proposed an amendment to the 4th AML, with 
the purpose of reducing anonymity of virtual currency. Not being accepted yet, its ability 
to produce an adequate respond to challenges, due to the special nature of virtual 
currency, is questionable. 
This thesis analyse European Union’s current Anti-Money Laundering legislation and its 
responsiveness to the characteristics of virtual currency that are attributable to the risks, 
with particular attention to crypto-currency, through a critical perspective. It aimed to 
raise awareness of the subject matter and contribute to the future of AML/CFT reuglations 
of the EU. 
 
Key Words: Virtual Currency, Cryptocurrency, Anti-Money Laundering, Combating 
Financing of Terrorism, EU Law, Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
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Resumo 
 
A preocupação internacional com o branqueamento de capitais está ligada ao narcotráfico 
da década de oitenta. Ao longo do tempo e devido ao contexto sócio económico e político, 
a legislação relacionada com o branqueamento de capitais foi sendo adaptada, permitindo 
introduzir uma resposta mais eficiente aos novos desafios. Isto foi particularmente visível 
na sequência dos ataques de 11 de setembro, momento a partir do qual a prevenção do 
financiamento do terrorismo passou a estar incluída no domínio do branqueamento de 
capitais, atendendo à ligação próxima entre estes dois fenómenos. 
Um novo desafio à legislação sobre branqueamento de capitais surgiu como 
desenvolvimento tecnológico, nomeadamente com o aparecimento de cripto-moedas. As 
moedas virtuais surgiram como uma alternativa rápida, fácil e pouco dispendiosa, para 
realizar pagamentos. Porém, a sua associação a atividades criminosas, uso generalizado 
e ausência de regulamentação própria conduziram a fortes preocupações por parte das 
entidades reguladoras. As abordagens tradicionais de combate à lavagem de dinheiro e 
financiamento do terrorismo tornaram-se obsoletas perante a natureza descentralizada e 
pseudoanónima destes novos métodos de transações, demandando uma reforma célere da 
legislação existente. 
A União Europeia, utilizando o Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia como 
forma de fundamentar os seus poderes, propôs uma alteração à diretiva 4.ª AML, com o 
objetivo de reduzir o anonimato das cripto-moedas. Não tendo sido ainda aprovada, a 
capacidade desta alteração produzir a resposta adequada aos desafios apresentados pela 
natureza especial das moedas virtuais é, no mínimo, questionável.  
O trabalho aqui apresentado analisa a atual legislação europeia contra o branqueamento 
de capitais e a sua capacidade de responder às características das moedas virtuais, às quais 
se atribui um elevado risco. Tem também como objetivo salientar questões relativas a 
esta temática e despertar maior interesse, assim como contribuir para o futuro da 
regulamentação AML/CFT da União Europeia. 
 
Palavras Chaves: Moedas Virtuais, Cripto-moedas, Anti-Branqueamento de Capitais, 
Combate ao Financiamento do Terrorismo, Lei Europeia, Cooperação Judicial em 
Assuntos Criminais.
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Introduction 
 
World Wide Internet is considered a valuable communication channel which allows 
individuals to interact with each other (peer-to-peer communication) from one place to 
another, instantly. While in its first times, there were very few contents that you could 
find on the internet, it transformed into the primary source of information with its wide 
range of content and of communication allowing people to conduct peer-to-peer 
communication. Innovations in information and communications technologies, including 
the mobile phones and internet, changed the way of conducting business and 
revolutionize commerce, marketing and the economy.  
E-commerce emerged as a result of the innovations in information technologies which 
made business-to-consumers (B2C) sales and business-to-business (B2B) commerce 
possible through electronic market platforms. It allowed a better access to markets and 
products, reduced the time for market research and made the transactions faster for the 
consumers and businesses. Nowadays buyers can access the wide range of products from 
the stores all over the world, choose and buy the one that suits them the best at their 
homes. E-commerce, in a very short-time, became one of the milestones of the world 
economies and global retail e-commerce sales is expected to reach $4.5 Trillion by 20211. 
Widespread usage of the electronic market platforms (online shopping) and electronic 
banking forced traditional payment systems (using checks or cash) to change and they 
eventually were replaced by the “electronic payment systems to pay for goods and 
services electronically through an electronic medium”2. PayPal is one of the most popular 
electronic systems which allows users “to send and receive money and to make an online 
payment”3 through their PayPal digital wallet. Online payment methods include bank 
transfers, credit and debit card requiring intermediaries as well as the alternative payment 
services and service providers that are emerged recently such as Bitcoin removing the 
third trusted party. 
                                                          
1 Orendorf A. (2017), “Global Ecommerce Statistics [Infographic] and 10 International Growt Trends You Need to Know”. Retrieved 
from https://www.shopify.com/enterprise/global-ecommerce-statistics. [Accessed on 01.02.2018]. 
2 SecurionPay, “What is an E-payment System?”. Retrieved from  https://securionpay.com/blog/e-payment-system/. [Accessed on 
23.02.2018].  
3 PayPal, Home Page. Retrieved from https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/home. [Accessed on 23.02.2018]. 
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Virtual currency, more specifically cryptocurrency4, emerged as a peer-to-peer electronic 
payment system eliminating the electronic medium. Its creation was a result of the 
financial crises of 2008 which reduced individual confidence on financial institutions and 
the services they provide.  
Bitcoin is the most prominent cryptocurrency with $160B market capacity, allowing 
transactions to occur between any two parties. Due to the removal of the intermediary, 
transaction does not require a bank account, gains speed and proceeds without being 
subjected to any fee or arbitrary limits of transfer. The technology behind it, called 
Blockchain prevents double-spending that is based on cryptographic proof rather than 
trust.5 
Usage of virtual currencies, more specifically cryptocurrency, has grew in numbers due 
to its easy, fast and cheap nature comparing with traditional payment methods. Along 
with its benefits, the system is not invulnerable to risks, namely money laundering and 
terrorist financing abuses, since it allows greater anonymity than traditional electronic 
payment systems  and monitored by no authority. Despite the transparency of the transfer 
of funds, sales through anonymous digital wallets enables launderers to conceal the 
origins of illegally obtained money and hardens the surveillance of the money flow. 
Besides, its international transmissibility allowing access through internet and cross-
border transfers increases the risks related to money laundering and terrorist financing. 
Despite its widespread usage and invulnerability to risks, it operated free from regulation 
for a long time. However regulators took a notice on the issue after facing with various 
cases namely Liberty Reserve, Silk Road and Western Express International, involving 
the usage of virtual currency for the purpose of criminal activities, namely drug 
trafficking, armament and fraud.  
Furthermore, some Bitcoin wallets were found that were related to some terrorist groups 
in Gaza Strip and to Daesh to fund their activities. Responses were various and distinct 
to these risks, while some countries opted to ban trade in virtual currency (China), some 
                                                          
4 A type of virtual currency which can be used to purchase real goods and services of the market. The way of operation of 
crpytocurrencies are decentralized, hence there is no authority that issues, controls and monitors the currency. Furthermore, the 
currency allows users to keep themselves anonymous. 
5 Nakamoto, S. (2008), “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”, p.1. 
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opted to issue licenses to the virtual currency exchangers6 (New York State Department 
of Financial Services- BitLicense), subjecting them to specific requirements with the 
purpose of reducing client anonymity. 
The European Union, on the other hand, adopted an incremental approach. Despite, the 
need of the European Regulation on virtual currency was raised for the first time in 2012, 
the European Union dealt with the issue on a theoretical level only, until 2016. An 
amendment to the 4th AML Directive was proposed on June 2016 as a part of Commission 
Action Plan against terrorist financing, following the Paris terrorist attack, aiming to bring 
virtual currencies under the scope of the Directive, requiring virtual currency exchangers 
to comply with customer due diligence and know your client (KYC) methods as it 
requires from financial institutions among others.  Having not been accepted yet, its 
adequacy in responding to virtual currencies is questioned due to the special 
characteristics of virtual currencies. 
Technology is faster than law making. When law seeks to regulate only a decade old 
technology, which might be still unfamiliar to many regulators, firstly the unique and 
distinct characteristics of that technology should be understood and embraced. Since it is 
a “new” reality, a wide spectrum of issues that might arise from that technology should 
be thought carefully. Moreover, along with its risks, benefits should be kept in mind not 
to hinder further development. Without taking all these factors mentioned above into 
account, regulations could be unable to fight effectively the abuses of that technology.  
This thesis aims to study EU’s Anti-Money Laundering Legislation and its application to 
Virtual Currency, with particular attention to cryptocurrency due to its decentralized and 
universal nature. In order to carry out research, the thesis is based on the main research 
question: “Is current AML/CFT Law of the European Union adequate in dealing with 
virtual currency?”. 
Assessment will be done by taking special characteristics of virtual currencies attributable 
to the risks into account; anonymity, international transmissibility and decentralization, 
and answering the question of whether these characteristics received a response from the 
proposal directive on AML or not. Instead of solely defining what virtual currency is and 
how it is regulated, the present investigation seeks to adopt a critical approach against 
                                                          
6 According to the definition of FATF Report, exchanger is a person or entity engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual currency 
for real currency. 
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current AML/CFT regulations of EU, highlighting its strengths and inadequacies. When 
needed, it will propose a solution to for the transformation of virtual currency into a AML-
compliant electronic payment system. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I. Money Laundering and Formation of International Anti-
Money Laundering Regime 
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1. International Money Laundering 
i. Basic Concepts 
The concept of Money Laundering refers, in general terms, to the process of cleaning the 
illegal earnings (dirty money) that are obtained from criminal activities such as corruption 
and bribery, drug-trafficking, extortion, human smuggling, illegal gambling, tax evasion, 
weapon smuggling and terror financing.  
Holding great amount of dirty money, mostly obtained in cash, can be held as the proof 
of a criminal offence. Linkage between the crime and the criminal would become more 
evident and take the notice of authorities.  In order to prevent prosecution, criminals wish 
to create an appearance in which the proceeds of crime seem to have its origins in legal 
sources. Therefore, by transferring dirty money through legitimate channels into the clean 
accounts, they disguise the illegal origins. By laundering the proceeds of crime, the 
criminals mainly aim to accomplish two things: to be distanced from the predicate offence 
and to be able use the illegally obtained money in the mainstream market without being 
caught by the authorities. 
The concept of Money Laundering is as old as the money. The historian Sterling 
Seagrave, in his book Lords of the Rim7, has written how Chinese merchants hid their 
wealth 3000 years ago from the rulers because they were afraid that the rulers would take 
away the profits and assets deriving from trade. Hence they developed techniques such 
as converting money to removable assets and investing on businesses that were out of 
Chinese jurisdiction.  
Despite the fact that money laundering is as old as the money itself, it was not 
criminalized until a very recent date. Previously what mattered was the criminalization 
of the predicate offence that lies under the money laundering and the prosecution of that 
offence. 
It is believed that the concept of money laundering is originated in the time of Prohibition 
(1920-1933) in the United States, where the production, importation and sales of alcoholic 
beverages were banned by the constitution. It is believed that enormous amounts of 
money were laundered in that time8, by gangsters, including Al Capone. Criminals 
                                                          
7 Seagrave, S. (2012), “Lords of the Rim”. Corgi. 
8 Muller, W. H. & Kalin, C. H. & Goldsworth, J. G. (2006), “Anti-Money Laundering: International Law and Practice”. John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd, p.3.  
 8 
benefitted from the Prohibition and generated enormous amounts of cash by smuggling 
alcohol. Cash generated from the organized crime9 was hidden through investments in 
legitimate businesses like cash-only laundromats in order to disguise the origin of the 
source and consequently to avoid criminal prosecution. Since then the laundry analogy is 
commonly accepted and used10, for the processes of cleaning dirty money.    
One should not be confused by the wording of the concept as what is laundered cannot 
be limited only by money. It includes all the assets that are obtained by carrying out a 
criminal offence. If earned as a result of an offence, luxury cars, jewelry, luxury watches 
and properties are considered as proceeds of crime. Anything of value can be laundered.11 
ii. The Process of Money Laundering 
Money laundering is a complex process that can be realized by using various methods, 
all containing three phases: placement, layering and integration. It should be kept in mind 
that there is always a primary offence or offences before the money laundering process 
which gives rise to the illegal funds.12  
Placement is the initial phase to start to the money laundering procedure. After obtaining 
illegitimate funds from criminal activities, the fund has to be transferred from its original 
form, mostly cash, to another form. Aim of this phase is to place the dirty money into the 
legitimate financial system. This stage of the money laundering can be carried out by 
various methods such as purchasing of paintings or antiques, acquisition of stamps and 
coins, buying chips at a casino, acquiring shares in private companies or placing funds 
into a banking system.  
For example, a government official received a bribe of €10000 in cash. In order to not get 
caught and charged by corruption offences, he buys shares from a company. He 
successfully places his money in the legitimate financial system. The profits derived from 
the shares would have a legitimate source since he is receiving dividend as a shareholder, 
from a legitimate business.  
                                                          
9 Not by only smuggling alcohol but also through prostitution, extortion and illegal gambling. 
10 Turner, E. J. (2011), “MONEY LAUNDERING PREVENTION, Deterring, Detecting, AND Resolving Financial Fraud”. John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., p.2.  
11 Sullivan, K. (2015), “Anti-Money Laundering in a Nutshell: Awareness and Compliance for Financial Personnel and 
Business”.Apress, p.16. 
12 Cox, D. (2014), “Handbook of Anti Money Laundering”. WILEY, p.7.  
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Another example would be if a drug dealer visits a casino and buys chips in exchange of 
illegally obtained money. After playing at different tables for couple of hours, he returns 
the chips that are remaining in his hand and leaves the casino. By doing this, he would 
place the dirty money into the legitimate financial system (placement) and distance the 
money from its origins (layering).  
Layering phase is the second stage of the money laundering process and the most complex 
one. In this stage, the criminal’s objective is to distance the funds from their origins. 
Launderers can use various methods to disguise the origin of the money. One of the most 
applied method is the movement of funds between various bank accounts in jurisdictions 
where the Bank Secrecy Laws are very strict such as Cayman Islands, British Virgin 
Islands and Panama. It is known that, in a sophisticated layering stage, funds can spin up 
to 10 times before the last stage.13  
In the aftermath of the layering phase the relation between the origin of the funds and the 
current position of the funds becomes ambiguous. The audit trail is so obscured that the 
investigation on the source of the money becomes harder. Hence, during or in the 
aftermath of the initial stage, authorities have higher chances to detect the launderer than 
in the aftermath of the second stage, layering.  
Additional to the movement of funds internationally, the launderer may opt to purchase 
paintings, antiques and precious gems at shops, auctions or flea markets and properties. 
However since various authorities are involved in the process of purchasing a property 
like lawyers, holding activities individually would be less risky for the launderer.  For 
instance, if the criminal purchases a valuable painting at an auction or an antique store, 
there will be no party involved in the process that has the obligation of carrying out anti-
money laundering measures.  
The final phase of the money laundering, called integration refers to the re-entry of the 
cleaned money into the mainstream economy. Cash being placed in the economy and 
layered, returns to the launderer as a legitimate earning to be used in any purpose. 
Launderer then can purchase luxury items.  
In order to carry out a successful integration phase, the cleaned money must appear to be 
derived from a legitimate source and purchases done by the launderer must not draw 
                                                          
13 Cox, D. (2014), “Handbook of Anti Money Laundering”. WILEY, p.17. 
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attention. The launderer might invest the money into a legitimate business and claim 
payments by creating fake invoices for the services that were not provided or were 
provided for less amount of money.  
iii. Money Laundering Schemes and Methods 
There are various methods of money laundering which are constantly evolving to 
circumvent the existential money laundering laws. Criminals develop new techniques 
every other day to avoid prosecution. While it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list 
of schemes, most commonly used methods are highlighted below, including laundering 
through financial institutions and non-financial businesses and/or professions. 
Cash Smuggling  
Cash smuggling is one of the most frequent method that is used by the launderers which 
refers to the shipment of large sums of cash across borders, to where the Bank Secrecy 
Laws are strict. Since every country has its threshold of carrying cash legally across the 
border, launderers hide the bulk of cash in a cargo, boat or on a person. Due to the strict 
border controls, criminals have been developing new techniques to smuggle money 
across borders without being noticed. Cars that have hidden compartments called ‘traps’ 
are one of the most applied shipment tools when it comes to cash smuggling. Once the 
cash is taken offshore, the launderer can deposit it to a bank (placement) and proceed to 
the second phase.  
As mentioned previously, a person might carry the large sums of cash on her, hidden in 
a personal belonging. A unique case of cash smuggling occurred in 2014 where a 40-
year-old woman was arrested by Dominican Republic Officials, who was carrying more 
than $70K in her stomach and more $69K in her suitcase which was believed to be linked 
to drug trafficking14.  
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in 2015’s National Drug Threat Assessment, 
reported that, “Currently, bulk cash smuggling is still the most widely-reported method 
used by [transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs] to move illicit proceeds.”15 
                                                          
14 New York Post News. (2014), “Woman arrested with over $70,000 in her stomach”. Retrieved from 
http://nypost.com/2014/10/25/woman-arrested-with-over-70000-in-her-stomach/. [Accessed on 10.11.2017].  
15 U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Strategic Intelligence Section. (2015), “National Drug Threat 
Assessment Summary”.  
 11 
According to the report, over 4000 bulk cash seizures were held in 2014 with the total 
over $383M. 
Casinos 
Casinos are great places for money launderers which could be used both for the placement 
and the layering phase. The technique is very easy: the launderer places his illegally 
obtained money into the financial system by buying chips from legitimately operating 
casinos and cashes them back in the check-out.  If any financial institution raises doubts 
on the origin of the money, the launderer would have a reasonable answer. Having various 
accounts in different casinos located in different jurisdictions would furthermore help 
him/her to distance the funds from their criminal origin.  
Structuring (Smurfing) 
Structuring refers to the act of splitting large sums of cash into smaller amounts below 
the currency reporting threshold. It is also called smurfing due to the fact that the 
launderer sometimes hires individuals (smurfs) to deposit the money from different places 
in small amounts to the same account. Structuring is a method of the placement phase. 
Once the total amount it deposited to the bank without being reported, the launderer can 
proceed to the second stage. 
Wire Transfers 
Wire transfers refers to the electronic transfers of money through banks or credit unions. 
While being a great part of a legitimate business’ day to day operation, it is commonly 
used by launderers for the layering phase.  Wire transfers are used by launderers in the 
conjunction of offshore accounts and shell companies.16 
Offshore Bank Accounts 
Offshore bank account refers to the accounts opened at a bank located in jurisdictions that 
have less controlling legal regulations and strict banking secrecy laws. By providing 
privacy, easy access to deposits, protection against investigation, low or non-taxation 
rates, they attract investors. Offshore financial centers (OFCs) have an important role for 
                                                          
16 Sullivan, K. (2015), “Anti-Money Laundering in a Nutshell: Awareness and Compliance for Financial Personnel and 
Business”.Apress. 
Cox, D. (2014), “Handbook of Anti Money Laundering”. WILEY, p.19. 
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hiding identity and the ownership of the assets.17 These accounts are used by the criminals 
in the layering stage, in order to obscure audit trail. The most popular offshore banking 
centers are Cayman Islands, Panama and British Virgin Islands.  
Shell Companies 
“Shell companies are businesses without substance or commercial purpose and 
incorporated to conceal the true beneficial ownership of business accounts and assets 
owned”18, in the countries that have lax anti-money laundering regulations. Despite the 
fact that the incorporation of these companies is not illegal they are mostly associated 
with shady business practices such as tax evasion, money laundering and to criminals 
who wish to circumvent international sanctions.  
The process starts with setting up a company in one of those abovementioned countries. 
An offshore financial service provider that offers financial secrecy to its client registers 
the company without disclosing the information on the ownership. To ensure the safety, 
the launderer may opt to create series of companies that are registered in different 
countries with each one owning the previous one. In this context, the complex chain of 
ownership would distance the beneficial owner from the ownership of the companies. 
Once the company is set, it can act as a real natural entity, as it may purchase goods and 
services on the behalf of the owners, open a bank account or hold assets. Upon the 
formation of the company, the dirty money can be deposited to the shell company’s bank 
account. Replaced money then can be used to buy luxury goods, be transferred to the 
launderer’s illegitimate business for further purchases or to a terrorist group to finance 
violence, and to promote an election campaign. Since the ownership information is not 
disclosed by the tax haven, the owner of the assets can avoid income tax, tax on capital 
gains or corporation tax of the residency company.  
On April 2016, 11.5 million documents were leaked from a Panamanian law firm 
Mossack Fonseca, containing information on how the global law firms and banks were 
helping their clients to evade tax, launder money and circumvent trade sanctions by 
providing them financial secrecy through offshore services such as shell companies and 
                                                          
17 European Parliament, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY, 
Economic and Monetary Affairs. (2017), “Offshore activities and money laundering: recent findings and challenges”.  
18 European Parliament, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY, 
Economic and Monetary Affairs. (2017), “Offshore activities and money laundering: recent findings and challenges”. p.20. 
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offshore accounts. Panama Papers revealed the names of head of states, politicians, 
celebrities and billionaires from all around the world and proved again the corrupted and 
criminalized nature of the offshore world.19  
Paradise Papers20 furthermore made it clear that as long as the beneficial owners21 of all 
companies are not disclosed, corrupt politicians, tax evaders and the other criminals will 
continue to use offshore companies to conceal their identity and to move their money 
across the globe.  
Fake Invoices 
Money Launderers commonly use generation of fake invoices in the layering phase of 
money laundering program. Export and import businesses are mainly benefitted for the 
laundering offence. Both high valued and low valued invoices are used by the criminals. 
For instance, a criminal purchases phones with the illegally obtained money and he 
exports these phones through an importer to another country. Despite the fact that the 
shipment has the value of $700K, it was invoiced at the value of $100K. When the 
importer sells the phones in the receiver country, it sells it for its real value and profit 
$600K from the sales, which represents the laundered money. This way, the source of 
importer’s profit would appear to be legitimate while the exporter pays tax only on the 
income that he claims to generate.  
Underground Banking 
Underground banking refers to any financial operation outside the traditional regulated 
banking sector, consequently outside of the supervisions of governments. It is known by 
different names in different parts of the world. While in India it is called Hundi, in Asia 
it is called Hawala which means “transfer” in Arabic. Operations are always conducted 
in cash but there is no actual movement of the money to be tracked.  
                                                          
19 The Panama Papers (2016) “Giant Leak Of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption. Retrieved 
from https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html. [Accessed on 12.11.2017]. 
20 Second biggest data leakage in history published in November 2017. 
21 FATF defines beneficial owner as “the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the person on whose 
behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also incorporates those persons who exercise ultimate eff active control over a legal person 
or arrangement.” See FATF. (2012), “INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION, The FATF Recommendations”. P. 110. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf. [Accessed on 10.11.2017]. 
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For example, John wishes to send €1,000 to Mary who resides in another country. John 
finds a hawala broker, Tom, and give him €1,000, in cash, to be received by Mary. Tom 
contacts with another hawaladar, Jane, in the country of Mary and asks her to give €1,000 
to Mary. Mary gets the money from Jane minus a commission. In the end of the 
transaction Tom owes €1,000 to Jane. All credit and debit transactions are recorded in a 
book by hawala dealers and settled afterwards.  
As one may see, the system, unlike traditional remittance networks, is solely based on 
trust in hawala network. Despite its common usage for legitimate reasons, it has been 
attributed to tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing based on its anonymity 
and untraceable nature. 
2. Formation of International Standards for Anti-Money Laundering 
Laws 
Despite the fact that money laundering operations have been carried out for more than 
3,000 years, it was not considered as a crime in any jurisdiction until the United States 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. The Act was a response to the growing numbers 
of money laundering cases and its undeniable linkage to drug cartels. By concealing the 
existence of illegal gains and legitimizing the source, money laundering schemes were 
making the prosecution of the criminals harder. Furthermore, enormous profits generated 
by the criminals and government’s inability to seizure those profits were contributing to 
the expansion of criminal activity and to the increase in the life span of criminal groups.22  
Criminalization of the money laundering was adopted as an instrument to fight against its 
predicate offence which in the context of the late 1980s was narco-trafficking. It was a 
part of the policy on “War on Drugs” of United States, declared during the Nixon 
administration.  
In June 1980, the Council of Europe published a recommendation on measures against 
the transfer and the safekeeping of funds of criminal origin23, warning the Member States 
                                                          
22 Gurule, J. (1995), “The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal Offense or Merely Affording Federal 
Prosecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity?” Scholarly Works, Paper 21, p. 824. Retrieved from 
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/21/?utm_source=scholarship.law.nd.edu%2Flaw_faculty_scholarship%2F21
&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages. [Accessed on 15.10.2017]. 
23 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS. (1980), “RECOMMENDATION No. R (80) 10 OF THE COMMITTEE 
OF MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES ON MEASURES AGAINST THE TRANSAFER AND THE SAFEKEEPING OF FUNDS OF 
CRIMINAL ORIGIN”. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/16804f6231. [Accessed on 09.08.2017]. 
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on the issue and recommending them to take important steps to ensure that their financial 
institutions are adopting such measures. This led to the adaptation of the similar laws in 
various member states such as France24, United Kingdom25 and Portugal26.  
Not long after, it became evident that confronting with the challenges posed by money 
laundering by just relying on unilateral domestic measures was not sufficient. In the 
advent of the globalization, financial systems were so intertwined that money laundering 
was transformed into a transnational criminal activity. National governments that had 
already criminalized money-laundering pressed the international community to act on this 
context27, with the purpose of strengthening cooperation across national boundaries and 
fighting with the criminal offences more effectively and efficiently. National Laws, 
outlawing money laundering, assisted agencies across the globe and contributed to the 
formation of international standards of anti-money laundering (AML) laws. 
International efforts to fight with money laundering and its predicate offence started to 
be held by the late 1980s. It aimed to form international standards, containing prohibitory 
and preventative measures.28 Their objective was to protect the stability and the integrity 
of the financial system; to provide a disincentive to economically motivated crimes 
through the reduction of profit and to decrease the inflow of illegal money that can finance 
further crimes; and to provide effective tools for the prosecution of money laundering and 
predicate offences.29  
                                                          
24 Loi n° 87-1157 du 31 Décembre 1987 relative à la lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants et modifiant certaines dispositions du code 
penal and Loi n° 88-1149 du 23 Décembre 1988 de Finances pour 1989 . Retrieved from https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/. [Accessed 
on 08.10.2017]. 
25 UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. Retrieved from https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/32/introduction. [Accessed 
on 08.10.2017].  
26 Decreto-lei n.° 15/93 de 22 de Janeiro 1993, Legislação de Combate à Droga. Artigo 23.°, Conversão, transferência ou dissimulação 
de bens ou produtos. Retrieved from 
http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=181&tabela=lei_velhas&nversao=1&so_miolo. [Accessed on 
08.10.2017]. 
27 Hülsse, R. (2007), “Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-Laundering Problem”. pp.166. 
28 Alldridge, P. (2008), “Money Laundering and Globalization“. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp.442. 
Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40206861?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. [Accessed on 21.10.2017]. 
29 Ioannides, E. (2014), “Fundamental Principles of EU Law Against Money Laundering”. Ashgate Publishing Company, pp.7.  
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Foundations of the AML laws were laid respectively by 1988 UN Vienna Convention30, 
1990 Council of Europe Strasbourg Convention31, 2004 UN Palermo Convention32, 2005 
Council of Europe Warsaw Convention33, and 1990, 1996, 2004 and 2012 
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force. While formed around the same 
objective, each Convention and Recommendation were held to respond a distinct concern. 
With the introduction of every new challenge to the combatting of money laundering, the 
international regime on anti-money laundering laws has changed to respond effectively 
to those challenges.  
Having its origins on narco-trafficking, scope of AML laws was broadened in accordance 
with the social and political concerns of the time. By the 1990s, some non-drug related 
offences were incorporated into the AML laws. It was considered crucial to include them 
into the context of the AML laws due to their transnational nature and severity. Those 
offences were considered as serious crimes which is controlled and carried out by 
powerful groups of criminals in a large scale and for long period of times, such as arms 
trafficking and human smuggling. In the early 2000s, the scope was broadened once 
again. The fear of and the concern on terrorism, in the aftermath of 9/11, led to the 
incorporation of the terrorism offences such as the funding of terrorism, into the AML 
Laws. 2012, FATF identified a new challenge to the combating of money laundering. 
Technological developments and the emergence of virtual currency was found to be the 
contributing factor for criminals to circumvent the existing AML laws. Identification of 
the new challenge, just like the previous ones that appeared, forced national and regional 
legislative bodies to transform their anti-money laundering laws once again.  
The evolution of international anti-money laundering laws is examined below in an 
historical order starting from 1980s. It aims to highlight the nexus between the concerns 
(social, political and economic) of the era and the transformation of the AML laws. The 
criteria used for assessment is the scope of AML laws, which divides the evolution into 
four distinctive periods; narco-trafficking and AML, organized crime and AML, funding 
                                                          
30 The United Nations (1998), “The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances”. 
31 Council of Europe (COE) (1990), “Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds of 
Crime”. ETS NO:141. 
32 United Nations (2004), “United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime”. 
33 Council of Europe (COE) (2005), “Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism”. ETS NO:196. 
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of terrorism and AML and the new challenges introduced by the technological 
developments to AML.   
i. Narco-Trafficking and Anti-Money Laundering 
Growing demand on narcotic drugs, its illicit production and trade were the main political 
and social concerns of 1970s and 1980s. The popularity of illicit production and trade of 
narcotic drugs was rising due to its profitability. Various criminal groups involved 
themselves into these activities to benefit from the demand and to fund their criminal 
activities further. Political arena not only considered the increase in drug related crimes 
a threat to the human life but also a threat to the economic, cultural and political 
foundations of society.34 Large profits generated by illegal trafficking were inclined to 
undermine legitimate economies, corrupt the structures of the governments and degrade 
the principles that society were based on, which led governments to wage war on drugs.  
Large sums of proceeds of crime had to be monitored and be subjected to seizure to 
prevent the financing of further crimes and to provide a disincentive for economically 
motivated crimes. However, control of the money flow could only be done if the money 
was found. No prosecution can be held against a criminal without the proof of the 
criminal’s involvement, which is the proceeds of the crime.  
At this point, we observe why and how the money laundering became a dear tool for the 
criminals. It helps criminals to disguise the true nature, the source and the ownership of 
the criminal proceeds, obscures the audit trail, consequently hardens the supervision of 
the money flow and complexes the prosecution procedure.  
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, known as 1988 UN Vienna Convention was implemented as a consequence 
of the 1980s political and social environment. It is the first multinational response 
embracing the link between illicit trafficking and money laundering which is emphasized 
in the introduction section of the convention as the following: “The Parties to this 
Convention are aware that illicit traffic generates large financial profits and wealth 
enabling transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the 
structures of government, legitimate commercial and financial business and society at all 
                                                          
34 The United Nations (1998), “The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances”.pp.10.  
 18 
its levels, are determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of 
their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive for so doing.”35  
With the purpose of preventing the money flow and eliminating obstacles for 
governments to investigate the proceeds of crime, convention regulates money laundering 
in two aspects: criminalization of money laundering and allowing for the confiscation of 
the proceeds of drugs related crimes.  
Article 3 subparagraph 1(b) of the UN Convention regulates the criminalization of money 
laundering. The Article states that “each party shall adopt such measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally: the conversion of transfer of property, knowing that such a property is 
derived from any offence36 or from an act of participation in such offence, for the purpose 
of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who 
is involved in the commission of such an offence to evade the legal consequences of his 
actions; the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movements, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an 
offence...”37.  
Allowance for the confiscation of the proceeds of drugs is regulated in Article 5 of the 
UN Convention. According to the Article, each party is obliged to identify, trace and free 
or seize proceeds, property, or instrumentalities for the purpose of eventual 
confiscation.38 For this purpose, no party shall try to justify declining to act with the 
provisions of bank secrecy law.39 Each party, if the proceeds are situated in their territory, 
is obliged to submit the request to obtain an order of confiscation to its competent 
authorities and to submit to its authorities an order of confiscation issued by the requesting 
party.40 
                                                          
35 The United Nations (1998), “The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances”.pp.10.  
36 A list of offences are stated in Article 3 subparagraph 1 (a). The offences that are regulated in the Convention are all drug related 
crimes. 
37 The United Nations (1998), “The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances”. 
38 Article 5(2). 
39 Article 5(3). 
40 Article 5(4)(a). 
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Despite the fact that UN Convention mainly aimed to tackle with the international illicit 
drug rather than money laundering, it laid down the foundations for international anti-
money laundering measures41. 
In response to the growing political concern of the misuse of financial systems by 
criminals laundering drug money, money laundering became the major issue in 1989 at 
Paris G7 Summit. The participants, recognizing the threat posed to the banking system 
and to financial institution42 , established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which 
aimed to deter and disrupt criminal finance43. The Financial Action Task Force was given 
the responsibility to examine money laundering techniques and new challenges, to 
establish comprehensive measures to combat money laundering globally, to monitor the 
countries’ progress in implementing the FATF Recommendations. 
Since 1989, FATF Recommendations are endorsed to be international standards44 for the 
fight against money laundering. By setting out international standards, FATF does not 
only assist governments to implement coherent, comprehensive and efficient anti-money 
laundering laws but also contributes to the convergence of AML laws across the globe in 
national and regional levels45. Strengthened global cooperation and approximation of 
laws produce a more solid weapon against a transnational crime that does not recognize 
boarders, makes monitoring and reporting of unusual patterns of transactions more 
efficient.  
FATF Recommendations, first issued in 1990, have been revised in 1996, 2001, 2003 and 
2012 in cooperation with the regional bodies under the observation of international 
organizations including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United 
Nations. Revision addresses the new challenges anti-money laundering laws are facing 
with and sets out measures that are relevant and necessary to combat with the introduced 
threat.  
                                                          
41 41 Ioannides, E. (2014), “Fundamental Principles of EU Law Against Money Laundering”. Ashgate Publishing Company, pp.13. 
42 Zagaris, B. (2015), “International White Collar Crime, Cases and Materials”. Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, Washington, DC, 2nd 
Edition, pp.59. 
43 43 Ioannides, E. (2014), “Fundamental Principles of EU Law Against Money Laundering”. Ashgate Publishing Company, pp.12. 
44 FATF produces ‘soft law’ that contributes to the implementation of ‘hard laws’. It creates the best practice with the expectation of 
compliance.  
45 45 Ioannides, E. (2014), “Fundamental Principles of EU Law Against Money Laundering”. Ashgate Publishing Company, pp.12. 
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The revision’s applicability is universal. The differences in the legal and financial systems 
are identified by the FATF and does not oblige the parties to implement the anti-money 
laundering framework identical to one another.46 The principles of the framework allows 
some extend of flexibility as measures that are used for implementation can be shaped in 
accordance with the constitutional and regulatory standards of that particular country. 
This way countries are able to produce and apply more effective measures to combat 
money laundering.  
ii. Serious Offences, Transnational Organized Crime and Anti-Money 
Laundering 
Council of Europe (COE) Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of Proceeds of Crime, known as the Strasbourg Convention of 1990, was created with the 
objective of fighting against serious crime which was considered as an international 
problem. Whereby the huge profits were considered to contribute to the life span of 
criminal activities, its method of combat was stated in its Preamble as “to deprive 
criminals of the proceeds of the crime, achieved through a well-functioning system and 
fortified international cooperation”47.  
Although it shares the same objective with UN Vienna Convention, The Strasbourg 
Convention diverges from it since it does not limit the predicate offence solely to drug-
related crimes. The Convention extends the scope of money laundering by stating that 
“predicate offence means any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were 
generated that may become the subject of a laundering offence”48. While an exhaustive 
list of predicate offences is not provided by COE, Article 6 (4)49 gives each jurisdiction 
the flexibility to identify and determine the offences in accordance with that jurisdiction’s 
perception and categorization of a predicate offence.  
The Strasbourg Convention brings a new aspect to the international cooperation by 
implementing ‘spontaneous information’ on Article 10. In that context, spontaneous 
                                                          
46 FATF on Money Laundering (1996), “The Forty Recommendations”. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201996.pdf. [Accessed on 23.10.2017]. 
47 Council of Europe (COE) (1990), “Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds of 
Crime”. ETS NO:141, p.1.  
48 Article 1 (e). 
49 Article 6(4) of the Convention states that “Each Party may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, by declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe declare that paragraph 
1 of this article applies only to predicate offences or categories of such offences specified in such declaration.” See COE ETS NO:141.  
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information means that, if a party considers that a disclosure of an information might 
assist another party in initiating or carrying out investigations, it may forward that 
information prior to any request. 
Another document that one would find it influential on the extension of the scope of the 
anti-money laundering regime is the 1990 and 1996 Recommendations of FATF. While 
Recommendation from 1990 invites each country to consider extending the 
criminalization of money laundering based on any other crimes, the revised 
Recommendation of FATF from 1996 obliges parties to extend the scope of the criminal 
offence of money laundering based on all serious offences. The Recommendation allows 
some extend of flexibility for countries to identify the serious crimes that are 
characterized as money laundering predicate offence. However in the Recommendation 
from 1990, it is also expressed that money laundering offences should be applicable to 
all serious crimes and to crimes that generate great amount of profits. 
The reason of this expansion again can be found in the political and social concerns of 
that time frame. It was understood that not only narco- traffickers were undermining the 
financial systems through money laundering. Instead, it was embraced that money 
laundering became a tool for all criminals to sustain their activities and avoid any 
prosecution. By broadening the scope, authorities aimed to render existing anti-money 
laundering laws applicable in various scenarios in which the criminals undermine the 
financial systems through money laundering and to prevent crimes in a larger scale. 
The United Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was published in 2002. 
The United Nations were concerned by the damaging social and economic effects of 
organized criminal activities50. They highlighted the need to strengthen international and 
regional cooperation to combat such activities and consequently the Convention, also 
known as the Palermo Convention, broadened the scope of the international regime.  
 
 
                                                          
50 Organized crime refers to the offences that are controlled and carried out by powerful criminal groups in a large scale, for a long 
period of time. Trafficking of drugs, human smuggling and arms trafficking were identified as some of the many forms that organized 
crime could take by the Palermo Convention.   
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iii. Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering 
Terrorism is the use of violence or threat of violence targeting civilians. They use the fear 
to accomplish their political, ideological or religious aims. A comprehensive definition 
adopted at the international level is important for the effective combatting mechanism, 
however the consensus among the international community has not been reach yet. 
Different bodies define it distinctively, yet containing the same elements: the use of 
violence against civilians to accomplish a certain change.  
According to the Directive on combatting terrorism of the EU51, “ ‘terrorist group’ means 
a structured group of more than two persons, established for period of time and acting in 
concert to commit terrorist offences”52. The Directive criminalizes the offences related to 
a terrorist group and of offences related to terrorist activities.53  Offences include 
receiving training for terrorism54, to travel for the purpose of terrorism, to provide training 
and recruit for terrorism offences55. Furthermore, committing or contributing to a terrorist 
offence and collecting or providing funds for terrorism related reasons56 are punishable 
under the Directive. 
Terrorist groups, in order to build an appropriate environment to carry out their activities, 
to sustain their position and to expand their reach, raise funds through legitimate sources 
as from charities, businesses and self-funding and illicit sources as from illegal goods 
trafficking, human smuggling, credit card fraud and extortion.57 At this point, the link 
between terrorism and transnational organized crime cannot be ignored.  
September 11th of 2001, the world witnessed the most deadly terrorist attack in the 
history. The terrorist group, Al-Qaeda held 4 coordinated attacks through four hijacked 
commercial planes. They were respectively crashed into North and South towers of the 
World Trade Centre, into Pentagon where the headquarters of the United States 
                                                          
51 European Union (2017), “Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating 
terrorism and replacing the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA”. 
52 Article 2 (3). 
53 Recital 6. 
54 Recital 11. 
55 Recital 16. 
56 Recital 12. 
57 FATF (2008), “FATF Terrorist Financing Typologies Report”. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf. [Accessed on 03.11.2017]. 
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Department of Defense was located and into Pennsylvania and caused the death of nearly 
3,000 individuals.  
In the aftermath of the attacks, the overriding imperative of the authorities was to identify 
and determine the methods to effectively combat with terrorism in the global level. Upon 
the identification of the importance of terrorist financing networks for the continuation of 
terrorist groups, authorities included disruption of these networks into their political 
agenda. Controlling the money flow became the most important tool to combat terrorism.  
Despite the fact that terrorism financing and money laundering processes are completely 
different, same overriding imperative in both cases - to control the money flow- brought 
combatting of money laundering and financing of terrorism under the same regulations.  
In this context, in 2001 the Financial Task Action Force was rendered responsible to 
introduce measures to deal with the issue of financing of terrorism and assist the countries 
to implement comprehensive laws. Eight Special Recommendations58 on Terrorist 
Financing was published to complete the international standards on combatting of money 
laundering and financing of terrorism. Integration of the special recommendations 
produced a stronger set of standards.59 
COE Convention on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, also known as Warsaw Convention of 
2005, was held recognizing the fact that the acts of terrorism by their nature pose a great 
danger to the fundamental political and socio-economic structures of the countries.60 In 
order to prevent any future attack and, if the attack could not be prevented, to prosecute 
the criminals some measures were implemented. Parties were not only obliged to 
criminalize the acts of terrorism but also the funding of the terrorism. Financing of 
terrorism was thought to be mitigated through advanced surveillance system carried out 
by the financial institutions across the globe. The rationale behind it was to constraint the 
                                                          
58 FATF (2001), “FATF Standards, FATF IX Special Recommendations”. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20-
%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf. [Accessed on 23.11.2017]. 
59 Cox, D. (2014), “Handbook of Anti Money Laundering”. WILEY, pp.22. 
60 Council of Europe (COE) (2005), “Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism”. ETS NO:196. 
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terrorist groups from their financing tools which would consequently limit their 
capabilities and their reach and render them vulnerable61.  
Being the first international treaty that obliges its parties to take all the necessary 
measures for the prevention of both money laundering and the financing of terrorism, the 
Warsaw Convention structured the most recent international standard for AML laws. 
With the entrance of the combatting of the financing of terrorism into the scope of AML 
laws, currently the law is called AML/CFT Laws. 
However, some critics have been questioning whether the financial institutions should be 
bothered to tackle with the issue of terrorist financing or not. Dionysios S. Demetis in his 
book Technology and Anti-Money Laundering: A Systems Theory and Risk-Based 
Approach supports this argument illustrating some facts on the costs of terrorist attacks. 
He indicates that amount of money involved in the funding of terrorism varies greatly in 
which some of the terrorist attacks cost so less that it would be impossible for financial 
institutions to detect within the pool of daily transactions.62 Efficiency produced by 
including financing terrorism into the money laundering agenda can be questioned. Yet, 
for the purpose of this thesis, the discussion is not carried out further.   
iv. Virtual Currency and Anti-Money Laundering 
The recent expansion of the scope of AML/CFT Law coincides with the emergence of 
virtual currency, more specifically cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, which introduced an 
alternative remittance method. It attracted individuals across the globe by providing its 
users a system that is not centralized on any authority and an online transaction method 
that is cheaper and relatively faster than the traditional methods. Anonymity63 that it 
allows for its users in their transactions facilitated to the realization of its widespread 
usage.  
FATF issued a report in 2014 on Virtual Currencies, Key Definitions and Potential 
AML/CFT Risks which elaborated the virtual currency and its characteristics. Emergence 
of the virtual currencies was considered a financial innovation in the report, recognizing 
its potential to improve payment efficiency and to benefit the existing online payment 
                                                          
61 FATF (2008), “Terrorist Financing”. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf. [Accessed on 13.10.2017]. 
62 Demetis, S. D. (2010), “Technology and Anti- Money Laundering, A Systems Theory and Risk-Based Approach”. Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, ISBN 978 1 84844 5567, pp.33. 
63 Virtual Currency and its characteristics is examined further in Part III. 
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systems.64  However, the virtual currency was not found to be beneficial only but also 
potentially vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing abuses due to its 
particular characteristics: decentralized nature, anonymity and international 
transmissibility.  The report intended to raise awareness of the national and regional 
authorities on understanding the new technology, so regulatory bodies could develop 
measures to combat with it more effectively.    
On 2015, FATF published a guidance for a risk-based approach to virtual currency. The 
purpose of the Guidance was stated in subparagraph 6 as “to identify the entities involved 
in Virtual currency services; and to clarify the application of the relevant FATF 
Recommendations to convertible virtual currency exchangers.”65 FATF expected 
countries to assess risks related to the virtual currencies and to implement regulatory 
measures in conjunction with those risks.  By guiding the national and regional bodies, 
the FATF intended to get similar regulatory responses for the purpose of enhancing the 
international AML/CFT standards. 
In the aftermath of the FATF Report and the Guidance, virtual currencies officially took 
their place in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Schemes and Methods next to 
the traditional tools such like shell companies, underground remittance services and wire 
transfers.  
Regulatory bodies of some jurisdictions have already implemented or are still in the 
process of implementing laws to prevent criminals to use virtual currency to circumvent 
existing AML/CFT Laws in compliance with the guidelines set out by FATF. On the 
other hand, while some of the jurisdictions are still studying to raise a better 
understanding of Virtual Currency and monitoring its development to set out more 
effective laws, some are simply banning the usage and the trading of it.  
Sufficiency of the regulatory responses or banning could be questioned, however one 
thing is certain, concentrated efforts have always been the primary imperative for the 
world to tackle with the transnational crime. Thus without some level of harmonization 
                                                          
64 FATF (2014), “FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definition and Potential AML/CFT Risks”. pp.9. Retrieved from 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf. [Accessed 
on 18.07.2017]. 
65 FATF (2015), “GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-BASED APPROACH, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES”. pp.3. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf. [Accessed on 02.08.2017]. 
 26 
in the laws that are aiming to reduce the risks posed by virtual currency, efficiency of the 
AML/CFT, in global level, is questionable.  
For the purpose of this thesis, it is found important to briefly touch upon the international 
standards on anti-money laundering and the combatting of terrorism. The international 
regime is structured around three policies: criminalization of the money laundering 
offences, introducing prevention measures and the focus on the financial intelligence.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II. European Union Anti-Money Laundering Laws
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1. Fundamentals 
Money laundering, terrorism financing and organized crime are considered to be 
significant problems threatening the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial 
system, as well as the single market of the European Union.66 Money launderers and other 
criminals involved in financial crimes benefit from the free movement of capital and the 
services that the European Union single market provides to its member states. Launderers 
benefit from the intertwined nature of the financial systems at the EU level and ease their 
program of money laundering and funding of terrorism. For the prevention of such 
interference with the financial systems and to mitigate abusive activities against the EU 
financial interests, the union enacts legal acts.67  
Collaborative actions between the member states of the EU are recognized to be necessary 
for the implementation of stringent rules. By proposing a minimum level of combating 
mechanism through legal instruments, the EU aims to approximate the definition of 
crimes, the sanctions of the offences and the scope of liabilities of the obliged entities 
across the union. Some level of harmonization in the rules related to the AML/CFT across 
the EU hinders criminals benefitting from the existing differences in domestic laws of the 
member states and presents a system of laws in which the union as a whole deals with the 
issue in the same manner. Furthermore, approximation of the law and regulations 
facilitates cooperation for the cases of money laundering crossing the borders. 
Approximation at the EU level is not the only objective of the European Union. It 
embraces the cross-border nature of money laundering whose domain is beyond the EU 
border. In order to produce effective combatting measures, the EU acknowledges the need 
to follow the path of the concentrated international efforts. Therefore, EU utilizes the 
international standards on AML/CFT measures introduced through a joint action of the 
United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Soft 
law that is introduced by that joint action is used as a framework law when materializing 
the hard law at the EU level.  
                                                          
66 European Union (2015), “Directive (EU) 2015/849  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist financing”, the 4th AML Directive. 
67 See two additional legal acts enacted aiming to protect the financial interests of the EU. The Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 
of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of European Public Prosecutor’s Office, having regard 
to the TFEU, and in particular Article 86. And The Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 
2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by the means of criminal law, having regard to the TFEU, and in 
particular Article 83(2). 
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Revised versions of the recommendations that are published by FATF are important 
sources for the EU. The EU amends its AML laws in conjunction with the revised 
versions of the Recommendations in order to respond to new challenges against 
combatting of money laundering and terrorism financing. As the FATF acknowledges the 
diverse nature of the legal, operational and administrative frameworks68, it confers the 
right to the national and regional bodies to tailor the standards in line with the existing 
domestic and regional laws. As a consequence, the recommendations taken as a model, 
the EU adjusts and tailors its AML/CFT laws in accordance with the existing EU treaties 
and the national laws of the member states.  
The AML laws of the EU contains three elements: the criminalization of the money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, prevention of money laundering and terrorism 
financing through obligations imposed on entities, and the utilization of financial 
intelligence units to enhance cooperation between the entities in exchanging information 
and analysing reports.  
The First AML Directive69 of the European Union dates back to 1991, following the 
FATF Recommendations. Its main objective was the prevention of the usage of financial 
and credit institutions to launder the proceeds of crime, the protection of the financial 
system and the European single market from the detrimental nature of predicate crimes 
and money laundering. It criminalized money laundering and imposed obligations to 
certain private sector entities for the prevention of money laundering. Despite the fact 
that the outcome it produced was limited, compared to the recent sophisticated AML/CFT 
laws, the First AML structured the base for the Second, Third and the Fourth AML 
Directive of the European Union. 
Second AML Directive70 amended and revised the First Directive on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering in 2001. Its aim was 
to enact a more consistent law by utilizing the FATF Recommendations and to eliminate 
the inconsistencies of the First Directive leading to a limited outcome. It extended the 
                                                          
68 Nechaev, V. (2014), “Setting and Implementing Global Standards against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”. Speech at 
Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin Ireland. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/speech-iiea-nechaev-feb2014.html. [Accessed on 09.08.2017]. 
69 European Union (1991), “Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering”. 1st AML Directive.  
70 European Union (2001), “Directive 2001/97/EC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering- Commission Declaration”. 2nd AML Directive. 
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scope of the required entities and broadened the definition of the predicate offence. 
Inclusion of the authority of identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscations of 
instrumentalities and the proceeds from crimes was the most important feature of the 
Second AML.   
Third AML Directive71 was enacted as a response to the political, social and economic 
concerns of the period in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks. It took into account the 
FATF’s revised 40 Recommendations and the 8 Special Recommendations related to 
anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing standards from 2003. By the 
implementation of the Third AML/CFT Directive, the scope of the obliged entities were 
broadened to the legal or natural persons acting in the exercise of their professional 
activities72 which were not obliged before, such as the lawyers. By comparing the Second 
and the Third AML Directives, one may easily observe the transformation of the EU anti-
money laundering regime into more comprehensive and a consistent law.    
The most recent AML/CFT law at the EU level is the Fourth AML Directive73 enacted in 
2015 with the purpose of improving the uniformity and of responding to the 
inconsistencies of the AML/CFT rules at the EU level. The modifications that it made on 
the Third AML Directive can be observed in the areas of customer due diligence (CDD), 
politically exposed persons (PEPs), ongoing monitoring, risk-based approach and the 
third party equivalence.74 The Fourth AML Directive is aligned with the FATF 
Recommendations from 2012 and the EU charter of fundamental rights.  
It is important to mention that there are various instruments implemented by the EU for 
advancing the agenda to fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. These 
instruments have a complementary character to the AML/CFT Directive of the EU. 
Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
October 2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the community is one of these 
instruments. Due to the application of the AML Directive to the transactions held through 
                                                          
71 European Union (2005), “Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing”. Third AML Directive. 
72 Article 2 (3) of Directive 2005/60/EC. 
73 European Union (2015), “Directive (EU) 2015/849  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist financing”, the 4th AML Directive.  
74 Deloitte (2015), “The Fourth EU Anti Money Laundering Directive”. Retrieved from 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ie/Documents/FinancialServices/investmentmanagement/ie_2015_The_Fourth_EU
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financial and credit institutions, the cash movements occurring outside of the authority of 
the financial and credit institutions were found to have the tendency to increase in 
numbers. Thus in order to prevent it from happening, the regulation targets the cash 
movements for illegal purposes. Regulation obliges persons entering or leaving the union 
to declare the amount of cash they are carrying to the competent authorities, whom are 
obliged to share that information with other authorities in other countries. Passengers are 
subjected to such obligation if the amount that they carry exceeds the threshold 
determined in the Regulation. In the context of the Regulation (EC) 1889/2005, that 
threshold is determined as €10,000 and above. 
Another complementary instrument is the Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and 
confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union. The 
objective of the Directive is to deprive criminals from their financial gains obtained 
through illicit activities. In the context of the Directive, financial gains include all 
proceeds of crime such as the direct gains or benefits from the illegal activities and 
previously laundered instrumentalities. The purpose of the Directive is to render criminal 
business methods more risky to provide a disincentive for the criminals and to decrease 
the number of criminals involved in such activities. 
Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1781/200675 is another complementary legislative act to the AML 
Directive. It targets the anonymous transfers which may occur through the payment 
service providers. The regulation allows the information on the payer and the payee to be 
provided to the payment service providers for the assessment of the risk level related to a 
specific transfer. The payment service providers are obliged to check the completeness 
of the information required on the payer and the payee. They are given the authority to 
determine whether to execute, reject or suspend a transfer in which the information of the 
payee and the payer is either missing or incomplete. Furthermore, the regulation obliges 
the service providers to report suspicious transactions to the competent authorities in 
conjunction with the reporting requirements regulated under the Directive (EU) 2015/849 
(4th AML/CFT) and with the national measures transposing that Directive.76  
                                                          
75 Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds is no longer in force. 
76 European Union (2015), “Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on the information accompanying transfers of funds repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1781/2006”, Recital 24.  
 33 
Measures in combating the AML/CFT abuses are introduced after a long process of 
identifying, assessing and understanding the risks. Regulatory bodies take every step 
carefully to produce such measures to target a specific risk that is previously identified.  
It is found important, for the purpose of this thesis, to briefly touch upon the current 
AML/CFT framework at the EU level in order to highlight the measures implemented 
targeting the identified AML/CFT risks.    
Prior to the examination of the 4th AML/CFT Directive, the paper assesses the source of 
the European Union’s power to regulate AML/CFT laws as a part of the EU Criminal 
Law, taking into consideration the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU and the EU Charter 
of the Fundamental Rights.  
2. EU Powers to Regulate Anti-money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism 
i. European Criminal Law and the AML 
The European Union was formed as a community, based on cooperation, to bring peace 
and prosperity to Europe in the aftermath of the World War II. Throughout its deepening 
and enlargement process, the EU extended its domain from solely monetary policies to 
social and political policies. Thus its nature has changed throughout time to build “ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe”77.  
Criminal Law of the European Union is relatively a new field of the European Union 
Law, developed as a consequence of the integration process and still continuing to be 
developed. The criminal law of the member states are not harmonized fully but some 
level of approximation has been achieved. The formation of EU Criminal Law can be 
observed in distinct three periods, from Maastricht Treaty of 1993 until the Amsterdam 
Treaty of 1999, from 1999 to the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 and from 2009 to onwards.  
Maastricht Treaty, dated back to 1993, was the first time in the European Union history 
where the cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs was mentioned. The treaty 
consisted of two separate treaties, Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) 
and the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It structured a pillar system (III Pillar System) 
that classified the powers of the EU under three groups. The pillars were dedicated 
respectively to European Communities, Common Foreign & Security Policy and Justice 
                                                          
77 European Union, Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities (1992), “Treaty on European 
Union”. Maastricht Treaty, ISBN 92-824-0959-7. Article A. 
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and Home Affairs. While the first pillar was subjected to supranational cooperation, the 
other two pillars were found to be too sensitive to national sovereignty for the 
supranational cooperation. Hence, those matters were handled with the intergovernmental 
method laid down respectively in the Title V and VI of the TEU. 
Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs was acknowledge to be crucial for 
the success of the single market and the safety the peoples of the Union. It covered the 
areas of combating terrorism, serious international crime, international fraud, judicial 
cooperation in criminal and civil matters, controlling illegal immigration and the common 
asylum policy. In this pillar, unlike the European Communities pillar, the European Union 
did not have exclusive powers to regulate the abovementioned matters. Under the 
intergovernmental method, the European Commission and the member states had the 
equal right to initiative, where the decision making was dependent on the achievement of 
unanimity at the Council, as stated in Article 42 of the TEU78.  
Pursuant to Article K.6 of the Treaty of European Union, The European Parliament only 
had a consultative role where the powers of European Court of Justice were limited. In 
order to strengthen the intergovernmental cooperation, the treaty created a system to 
exchange information between national police forces known as the European Police 
Office (Europol).79 
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the legal instruments were specific to each of the pillars. 
The instruments to be utilized under the second and third pillar (intergovernmental 
method) were different than the instruments under the first pillar which were the 
regulations, directives and decisions. Pursuant to Article K.3 of the TEU80, the legal 
instruments for the third pillar were divided into three: joint positions, joint actions and 
conventions.  
Various conventions, which are international treaties governed by the international law, 
were enacted in the area of criminal law such as the CEO Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime of 1990, Criminal Convention 
                                                          
78 European Union, Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities (1992), “Treaty on European 
Union”. Maastricht Treaty, ISBN 92-824-0959-7. Article 42. 
79 European Union, Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities (1992), “Treaty on European 
Union”. Maastricht Treaty, ISBN 92-824-0959-7. Title VI, Article K.1 (9). 
80 European Union, Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities (1992), “Treaty on European 
Union”. Maastricht Treaty, ISBN 92-824-0959-7. 
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on Corruption of 1999 and CEO Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005. 
Influence of these conventions in introducing an appropriate legal framework in European 
Criminal Law was limited since many countries have signed but not ratified the Treaty. 
In time, closer ties between the member states required a stronger cooperation and 
consequently implementation of a more effective legal instruments under the third pillar 
to produce. Criminal law across the EU had to be more harmonized in order to prevent 
utilization of the diversities in criminal laws of the member states. With the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 2009, even though the decision-making process remained 
intergovernmental, the legal instruments specific to the third pillar gained a more 
supranational character.  
Framework Decisions, stated in the Article 3481 in the consolidated version of the EU, 
were introduced to be utilized by the Council in order to approximate the laws and 
regulations of the member states in Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters82. 
Framework Decisions, in their nature, carry similar characteristics with the Directives 
that are governed by Article 249 of the TEC. They are binding upon the member States 
as to the results to be achieved but choice of method and form to be applied is left to the 
member states. However, they do not entail direct effect in any case and it is where they 
are differentiate from the first pillar community directives.  
Direct effect is a principle of EU that was stated by the European Court of Justice in the 
judgement of Van Gen den Loos- Case 26/62 of 1963. Direct effect confers rights on 
individuals and enables them to invoke a provision before a national or European Court.83 
A judge is obliged to interpret a national law in conformity with that particular directive, 
the EU Law. On the other hand, since the TEU excludes direct effect in Article 34, the 
framework decision does not directly entails rights and obligations to the individuals.   
Pursuant to Article 35, framework decisions under the TEU were only subject to the 
preliminary rulings to be interpreted by the ECJ. The ECJ did not have jurisdiction to 
review the validity, proportionality of operations carried out84, to review the legality of 
                                                          
81 European Union (1997), “Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, signed at Amsterdam 2 October 1997”. TEU Consolidated (1997), ISSN 0378-6986. Retrieved 
from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1997:340:FULL&from=EN. [Accessed on 07.09.2017]. 
82 Name of the third pillar was changed with the Amsterdam Treaty. 
83 European Union, “The Direct Effect of European Law”. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14547. [Accessed on 07.11.2017]. 
84 TEU Consolidated (1997). Article 35(5). 
 36 
framework decisions and decisions in actions brought by a member state or the 
Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of any procedural 
requirement85 and to rule on any dispute between member states regarding the 
interpretation or application of acts86.  In another words, non-compliance due to failure 
to transpose or non-transposition could not give rise to any sanctions on the member 
states. Furthermore, the Commission was not given the power to monitor the 
implementation of the framework decisions. Pursuant to Article 36(2) Commission was 
to be fully involved in the area of police and judicial cooperation but does not hold the 
power to act upon infringement.  
Until 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon, many Framework Decisions were adapted in the third 
pillar based on the principle of mutual recognition87. The Principle was established in the 
Tampere meeting of the European Council on 1999 and is considered as one of the main 
contributors for a stronger cooperation in police and judicial matters. By adopting this 
principle, centralized policies were abandoned and mutual recognition in the decisions of 
member states was enhanced.  
Mutual recognition means that a decision taken by a member state on a specific case may 
be applied by another member state, when faced with a particular criminal case similar to 
the case decided previously. The principle does not only contain the recognition of 
judgements but also recognition of the definition of the offence, recognition of the 
offender and offence, recognition of the legal liabilities and the recognition of the 
penalties. Hence, mutual recognition in criminal law creates standard combatting 
mechanism and brings the criminal laws of the member states closer to one another.    
With the implementation of Framework Decisions in conformity with the principle of 
mutual recognition and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the EU criminal 
law started to be shaped. From the Amsterdam Treaty and onwards, the third pillar, Police 
and Judicial Cooperation gained a more supranational character. However, due to the 
nature of the framework decisions, especially the lack of sanctions for non-
implementation, the framework decisions were also not sufficient to provide a 
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harmonized legal framework at the EU level. To provide an adequate response, the Lisbon 
Treaty was adopted and new measures were introduced. 
The three pillar structure, as well as the different legal instruments under each pillar was 
abolished by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. It amended the Treaty on the European Union 
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community and gave EU a single legal 
personality. The amendment, the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), harmonized the legislative instruments in the area of criminal law where the 
framework decisions and the conventions were replaced by the directives and regulations. 
By changing the legal instrument regarding the criminal matters, the legal acts created 
consistency in the common legal system of the EU and strengthened the combat against 
serious crimes which has a transnational nature.  
The decision making process along with the method of cooperation in criminal matters 
have gained a supranational character with the enactment of the TFEU. The sovereignty 
of the member states was limited to regulate the criminal matters while the power of the 
European institutions was extended.  
Unlike in the previous legal acts, with the enactment of the TFEU the Commission is 
conferred the sole right of initiative, rather than sharing that right with the member states. 
Decision making process regarding the criminal matters remained in the competence of 
the Council but the rights of the European Parliament was extended in a way that the 
Parliament attained the power to suspend a proposal. By conferring rights to the European 
Parliament, the process of regulating criminal matters gained a democratic character. 
Unanimity rule in decision making procedure on the other hand was replaced by the 
qualified majority voting which ruled out the possibility of a simple veto to bring a 
proposal to an end as a consequence of the departure from intergovernmental method of 
cooperation.  
Since the enactment of the TFEU, the Commission is conferred the power to monitor the 
implementation of the provisions by the member states. Following the Article 258 of the 
TFEU, if the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the Treaties, it may initiate an infringement action against that member state and 
bring the matter to the ECJ. 
Furthermore, ECJ does not have a limited role in regulating the criminal matters. Pursuant 
to Article 220, when the Commission brings a case before the Court, if the ECJ finds that 
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Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties and infringed the EU 
law, the ECJ has the right to impose a penalty payment on the member state. Thus the 
Court ensures the uniformity of the implementation of the Union Laws and compliance. 
Chapter 4 of the TFEU regulates the judicial cooperation in criminal matters between 
Articles 82 to 86. According to the Article 82 of the TFEU, principle of mutual 
recognition of judgments and judicial decisions lies in the core of the judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters. The European Parliament and the Council are given the responsibility 
to establish minimum rules by means of the directives related to mutual admissibility of 
evidence between member states; the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; the 
rights of victims of crime and the any other aspects of criminal procedure identified by 
the Council.88 The directives do not restrain member states to adopt stricter provisions, 
as long as the minimum rules are met.   
There are various legal legislations that are adopted under the TFEU aiming to harmonize 
the criminal laws and regulations of the member states for the appropriate protection of 
the Union policies. As regard to the Article 83, it is European Union’s competence to 
regulate criminal matters regarding the certain areas in combatting with serious crimes 
with a cross-border dimension. Areas of crime are non-exhaustively listed in Article 83 
where its domain may be extended by the Council due to the developments in crime. 
Indicated areas of crime include terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug and arms trafficking, corruption, money 
laundering, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organized crimes. 
Whenever the nature of the crime or the effect of the crime leads to the need to combat in 
common grounds89, the European Parliament and the Council together may utilize one of 
the instruments such as a directive, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure 
regulated in Article 294.  
In accordance with the Article 83 of the TFEU, it is European Union’s competence to 
regulate matters related to money laundering and the financing of terrorism since the 
nature of the crime and the effect of the crime lead to the need to combat in common 
grounds. AML/CFT laws are a part of the criminal law of the European Union, regulated 
                                                          
88 European Union (2012), “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU”. The Lisbon Treaty, Article 82(2). 
89 TFEU, Article 83. 
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to protect the financial interests of the European Union and to produce appropriate 
measures to prevent the misuse of the financial system.  
ii. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the AML 
In the treaties of the EC, the Fundamental Rights were neither explicitly included nor was 
made legally binding other than in few articles such as the Article 7 of the EEC treaty 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality or the Article 119 of the EEC 
ensuring the equal payment for men and women.90 It was solely a declaratory document 
which had no legally binding effect. As a consequence, it was leading to the problem of 
having two levels of fundamental rights within the EU regarding the rights of the criminal 
and the victim. By the enactment of the TFEU and the enhancement efforts to harmonize 
the laws and regulations of the member states, the Charter of Fundamental Rights91 
became a part of the European Treaties.  
The Charter have become legally binding upon the EU institutions as the primary EU law. 
Thus, whenever the EU institutions are legislating new laws for the realization of the 
union policies and member states are acting within the scope of the EU law, fundamental 
rights and freedoms, as well as the rule of law must be complied.  
Incorporation of the Charter into the Treaties led to the elimination of the differences in 
the level of rights and freedoms within the EU and the enhancement of the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition in criminal law. Furthermore, since the Charter 
became legally binding for EU institutions in enacting laws, it was easier for Member 
States to limit their sovereignty in the area of law that intervenes with the internal matter 
such as the criminal law.    
Preventive measures in fighting with money laundering and the financing of terrorism 
may appear to be violating the fundamental rights and freedoms indicated in the Charter 
since it limits some of the rights and freedoms. The rights and freedoms of individuals 
that the AML laws intervene with are the right to respect for private and family life, home 
and communications92 due to customer due diligence measures carried out by the obliged 
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entities, right to the protection of personal data93 due to storage and transferring of 
personal data between the financial units and freedom to conduct a business94. It is 
important to highlight that these limitations do not have an arbitrary character. The 
contrary, it has its basis in the rule of law.   
In accordance with the Article 52 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, the 
EU law may limit the fundamental rights and freedoms to an extent. The Article states 
that if any limitation is brought against the fundamental rights and freedoms it should be 
proven necessary for the overriding general interest or the protection of another individual 
recognized by the law. Measures adopted should not go beyond what is needed to for the 
attainment of the objectives of the law and should respect to the principle of 
proportionality.   
Regarding the limitations led by the application of the AML/CFT, it is important to 
remark the overriding European general interest against fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Money laundering is detrimental for the economic, financial and social segments of the 
society, which threatens the security and safety of the peoples, states and the democratic 
institutions at the national, regional and global level by fuelling the activities of criminals 
involved in illicit narco-trafficking, illegal arms deals, corruption and the terrorism. It 
helps criminals to operate and expand their criminal enterprises which leads to the 
manipulation of the financial system, erosion of the integrity of the financial institutions 
and the creation of unfair competition between legal and illegal businesses. Hence, 
limitations are justified by the European general interest such as the protection of the 
integrity of the financial institutions, the legal businesses from unfair competition, 
economic prosperity and the security of the peoples. 
3. AML/CFT Framework at the EU Level 
The EU has put forward the 4th AML Directive in 2015, taking into account the FATF 
Standards published in 2012. The directive has been transposed into the judicial systems 
of the Member States by 26th June 2017.  Being the current AML/CFT legislation adopted 
at the EU level, it approximates the criminal laws of its Member States in the area of 
combating money laundering and terrorist financing and produces a more sophisticated 
combatting mechanism.   
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The objective of the Directive was stressed out in Article 1 (1) as “to prevent the use of 
the Union’s financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist 
financing”95. The Directive introduced the minimum standards for the member states to 
transpose into their judicial system, where the Member States were given the flexibility 
to adopt stricter provisions within the limits of the Union law including the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights.  
The Member States are obliged to implement the Directive in full compliance with the 
Union laws and the principle of proportionality96 as the application of the directive should 
not go further than what is intended to be achieved. Additionally, since the Directive 
involves the requirements of collection, processing, storage and the transfer of the 
personal data, member states should ensure to adopt all necessary measures to prevent 
any violation of the data protection law97 and the fundamental rights.  
As stated in the Recitals of the Directive, “the Directive respects the fundamental rights 
and observes the principles recognized by the Charter, in particular the right to respect 
for private and family life, the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom to 
conduct a business, the prohibition of discrimination, the right to an effective remedy and 
to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence.”98  
For the purpose of this thesis, the relation between the AML/CFT laws and the data 
protection law is not assessed further. However the key highlights of the 4th AML 
Directive in fighting with the money laundering and terrorist financing are examined 
below.  
The Directive obliges member states to prohibit and criminalize money laundering and 
terrorist financing and obliges member states to implement the necessary measures for 
the prevention of money laundering and for the enhancement of the financial intelligence. 
As a prevention method, the Member States are rendered responsible to ensure that the 
sufficient instruments are made available to the obliged entities99 in carrying out 
                                                          
95 Directive 2015/849, Article 1(1). 
96 TEU Consolidated, Article 5(1). 
97 European Union (2016) , “Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC”. General Data Protection Regulation. 
98 Directive 2015/849, Recital 65. 
99 Obliged entities are the intermediaries of the transfer of funds. 
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particular AML/CFT requirements, such as customer identification and verification, 
investigation and reporting of the unusual and suspicious activities.   
Money Laundering is considered as the conversion or transfer of property which is 
derived from criminal activity for the purpose of disguising the true nature of the source. 
In the context of the Directive, “‘property’ means assets of any kind whether corporeal 
or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents of 
instruments in any form including electronic or digital, evidencing tile to or an interest in 
such assets”100.  
Under the Directive, definition of the criminal activity is applicable to all serious crimes 
including the drug-related offences, the activities of criminal organizations, fraud 
affecting the EU’s financial interests, corruption and all other offences which are 
punishable by deprivation of liberty101, including tax crimes related to the direct and 
indirect taxes102.   
Considering all the facts above, one may easily observe that the Directive, by defining 
“property” and “criminal offence” in a broad way, increases the number of the cases for 
which the Directive is applicable. Taking into consideration the provision of the 
Directive, -any property, meaning assets of any kind that is derived from any criminal 
offence being transferred to disguise the origin of the source would be enough to qualify 
the person as an offender of money laundering.  
As a part of the prevention policy, the Directive puts forward the entities who are obliged 
to carry customer due diligence (CDD) and know your client (KYC) measures. As a part 
of the CDD and KYC, these entities are responsible for the identification and verification 
of its customers and the investigation of the transactions and business relationships. 
Furthermore, if any transfer of funds is found to be suspicious, these entities are obliged 
to report to the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).  
Obliged entities are stated in Article 2(1) as the credit institutions, financial institutions 
and the natural or legal persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities, 
including estate agents, legal professionals, auditors and providers of the gambling 
                                                          
100 Article 3(3). 
101 Article 3(4). 
102 Differing from the previous AML Directives, the 4th AML Directive includes tax crimes in the scope of predicate offences. 
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services103. It is important to highlight once more that what laundered is not only the 
money as well as through whom it is laundered is not solely financial or credit institutions. 
Any property attained through illegal ways and is transferred through lawyers, real estate 
agents or gambling services to disguise its nature is considered as laundering. Therefore, 
it is highly crucial for the authorities to think of and consider all possible middle man 
who may take a part in money laundering and the financing of terrorism in order to 
mitigate the risks as much as possible. The Fourth AML, incorporating all possible middle 
man who are identified to have a high risk profile and obliging those entities to carry out 
CDD and KYC, introduces a strong and a sophisticated AML/CFT.   
FIUs are central national authorities who collect and assess the information provided by 
the obliged entities on suspicious transactions, accounts and business relationships and 
on other information related to money laundering, financing of terrorism and any 
predicate offences. FIUs are a part of the Egmont Group (Expert Group on Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing) which is an international exchange platform of 
financial intelligence situated at the core of the global efforts in combatting money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism.104  
As highlighted at the recitals105 of the Directive, the coordination and the cooperation 
between the member states FIUs, as well as between the FIUs and other third country 
financial intelligence units, are crucial for efforts to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing due to its transnational nature. The exchange of information should be 
encouraged and made available to the bodies of the other countries, for the timely 
management of the risks. Member States of the EU, under the directive are obliged to 
provide necessary instruments to the FIUs for the information to be exchange freely 
whether spontaneously or upon request.    
Aligned with the 2012 FATF Recommendations, the 4th AML enhances the risk-based 
approach in assessing each case of money laundering and terrorist financing. It highlights 
the importance of a supranational approach, consisted of various Union, international and 
national based bodies including the Egmont Group and the Financial Intelligence Units 
                                                          
103 The inclusion of the entire gambling sector in the scope of the obliged entities is one of the key points of the 4th AML Directive 
while only the casinos were subjected to specific requirements under the 3rd AML Directive. 
104 Egmont Group, “About”. Retrieved from https://egmontgroup.org/en/content/about. [Accessed on 15.09.2017]. 
105 Directive 2015/849, Recital 55-56. 
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in identification, understanding and mitigating the risks related to money laundering and 
terrorist financing.106 As a part of the risk-based approach the member states are required 
to put forward the documents proving that they assessed the risks related to money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism and took sufficient measures to mitigate those 
risks.107  
Transparency in the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) of a legal entity is 
one of the most important factor in the success of AML/CFT laws. The Directive 
acknowledges it and stresses out the importance of the identification and verification of 
the beneficial owners in tracking the criminals who are hiding their identity behind legal 
entities through the utilization of offshore financial services, offshore bank accounts and 
shell companies. According to the provisions of the Directive, in order to make 
identification and the surveillance of the client more transparent and to prevent the misuse 
of the legal entities, member states are obliged to “ensure that corporate and other legal 
entities incorporated within their territory are required to obtain and hold adequate, 
accurate and current information on their beneficial ownership, including the details of 
the beneficial interests held”108 and to ensure that the collected information is available 
for all the competent authorities, obliged entities and the FIUs.109   
As a part of the policy that adopts a risk-based approach, the cash-payment threshold for 
obliged entities to carry out CDD is decreased from € 15,000 to €10,000110 and the 
conditions to carry out Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) was changed. EDD is regulated 
under Article 18 and refers to the cases where the obliged entities are dealing with the 
natural or legal persons located in a high-risk third country111, or when the customer 
profile or the status of the transaction is considered to carry high risk112. In addition to the 
basic information, the Directive obliges entities to examine a greater domain of 
information113 under the EDD. Obliged entities with majority-owned subsidiaries or 
                                                          
106 Directive 2015/849, Recital 24. 
107 Directive 2015/849, Recital 22. 
108 Directive 2015/849, Article 30 (1). 
109 Directive 2015/849, Article 30 (5). 
110 Directive 2015/849, Recital 6. 
111 The European Commission is delegated to determine the high-risk third countries whose AML/CFT laws are deficient. See 
European Union (2016), “Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 of July supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 
of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies”.  
112 Whether a transaction is considered risky or not is based on evidence. 
113 Directive 2015/849, Article 18 (2). 
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branches located in the high-risk countries are obliged to meet with the requirements of 
the Directive at those subsidiaries or branches. After the risk assessment process, the EDD 
may be carried out when dealing with those branches or subsidiaries.114  
With the 4th AML directive, again as a part of the enhanced risk-based approach, the 
obliged entities were invited to reconsider the way that they manage their cash-intensive 
clients. While previously the customers located in the EU/EEA, or in a jurisdiction that 
imposes equivalent requirements, were automatically granted with Simplified Due 
Diligence (SDD) status, the 4thAML conditioned the allowance of SDD status upon proof. 
According to the Article 15 (2) “before applying SDD measures, obliged entities shall 
ascertain that the business relationship or the transaction presents a lower degree of risk.” 
In another words, without the proof indicating the low risk profile of the transaction, a 
business relationship or a client, the SDD status cannot be granted automatically. 
Application of the SDD status should be backed up by the documentation. 
Adoption of the risk-based approach also lead to the broadened definition of the 
politically exposed persons115 (PEPs). In the context of the 4th AML, foreign politically 
exposed persons, as well as the domestic PEPs, are subjected to EDD measures performed 
by the obliged entities. Specific requirements laid down by the directive related to the 
PEPs do not have a criminal nature, rather have a preventive nature. A person who is 
politically exposed cannot be considered automatically as being a criminal.116 Further 
assessment is required to prove the high-risk profile of that person.  
Considering all the characteristic of the AML/CFT framework indicated above, one may 
easily say that the anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws are based and 
dependent greatly on the cooperation of the trusted third parties. These entities are the 
source of intelligence that are rendered responsible to monitor abnormal money flow, 
identification and verification of the natural and/or legal persons who are transferring 
funds and reporting of the suspicious business activities or transactions. In the traditional 
remittance systems, no transaction can be made and verified without passing from these 
parties, thus they are the gatekeepers of any transaction for the prevention of money 
laundering and terrorism financing offences. Taken out of the equation, the system does 
                                                          
114 Directive 2015/849, Article 18 (1). 
115 Under Article 3 (9) of the Directive 2015/849, politically exposed persons are referred as “a natural person who is or who has been 
entrusted with prominent functions”. The list consisted of the politically exposed persons are indicated under Article 3(9).  
116 Directive 2015/849, Recital 33. 
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not function properly since there is no intelligence provided to catch the criminals. The 
remittance system that eliminates the trusted third party becomes short in combating with 
the money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  
Transparency is another catalyst for the system to work properly which is ensured by 
these trusted third parties, the obliged entities in the context of the Directive. Trusted third 
parties by identifying and continuously monitoring the natural persons and the beneficial 
owners of the legal entities, enable the authorities to go back in the audit trail and detect 
the criminal. Without transparency, the system would fail to track the natural or legal 
persons, the laundered money and the fund that benefitted a terrorist group. Thus, a 
system that is structured around anonymity would help the audit trail to be obscured and 
make detection of the criminals way harder than it is.  
As it is put forward in the next chapter, two features of virtual currency, more specifically 
cryptocurrency, render the existing AML/CFT laws incapable of responding and 
mitigating the risks. Being pseudo-anonymous and eliminating the trusted third parties, 
cryptocurrency forces regulatory bodies to identify, assess and understand the new 
challenges and to transform the existing AML/CFT laws to tackle with those challenges. 
FATF report on the Virtual currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks 
from 2014 and the FATF guidance for a risk-based approach on virtual currencies from 
2015 led European Union Commission to propose an amendment to the 4th AML 
Directive, to bring Virtual Currencies into the scope of Directive (EU) 2015/849.117  
The proposal of revision was presented upon the terrorist attacks of Paris and the Panama 
Papers exposure, as a part of the European Commission’s Action Plan for Strengthening 
the Fight against Terrorist Financing announced in February 2016. The proposal obliges 
virtual currency platforms to perform the same CDD and KYK methods as the financial 
institutions and non-financial businesses and professions. Assessment of the proposal is 
curial for the determination of whether the virtual currencies are sufficiently dealt under 
the proposed AML/CFT law. 
Prior to the critical assessment of the proposed AML/CFT on whether it sufficiently deals 
with the potential abuses caused by the usage of virtual currency, it is important to put 
                                                          
117 European Commission (2016), “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending 
Directive 2009/101/EC”.  
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forward the basic concepts related to the virtual currencies and its characteristics that are 
likely to abuse AML/CFT regulations.
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1. Basic Concepts 
i. Virtual Currency 
There is no definition of virtual currency that is internationally accepted. Various 
institutions defined it differently. European Central Bank in 2012 defined it as “a type of 
unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its developer, and 
used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community.”118 Meanwhile 
the U.S. Treasury defined it as a “medium of exchange that operates like a currency in 
some environments, but does not have all the attributes of real currency.”119  
Despite the lack of a uniform definition and classifications on legal status120, one should 
avoid confusion between virtual currency and fiat currency, virtual currency and 
electronic money and virtual currency and digital currency. Fiat currency, also known as 
national currency, is issued and controlled by a country. It is put into circulation by central 
authorities and recognized as a medium of exchange. In contrast to fiat currency, virtual 
currency is a medium of exchange and/or a unit of account or store of value that does not 
have a legal tender status. Thus a creditor is not obliged by law to accept virtual currency 
as a form of payment to extinguish a private or public debt. Additionally, virtual currency 
is not always administrated or issued by a central authority. 
The nature of it, on the other hand, is distinct from electronic money (e-money). Article 
2 of the Electronic Money Directive 2009/110 defines electronic money as 
“electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a claim 
on the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment 
transactions… which is accepted by a natural or legal person other than the electronic 
money issuer.”121  While some elements of virtual currency coincide with electronic 
money, there are significant differences. E-money is a digital representation of fiat 
currency and maintains its unit of account and legal tender status. It is equal to an amount 
                                                          
118 European Central Bank (2012), “Virtual Currency Schemes”. pp.5. 
119 Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN (2013), “Application Of  FinCEN’s Regulations to 
Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies”. FIN-2013-G001, pp.1. Retrieved from 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. [Accessed on 06.09.2017]. 
120 There is an ongoing debate on the legal status of Virtual Currency, more specifically cryptocurrency on whether it is a currency, 
an asset or something else. Jurisdictions treat it differently. 
121 European Union (2009), “Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic 
money institutions”. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009L0110. [Accessed on 
06.09.2017]. 
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of fiat currency exchanged into electronic form by a central authority. On the other hand, 
unit of account changes for the virtual currencies.   
Distinction between virtual currency and digital currency comes from the division 
between digital economy and the virtual economy. While digital economy describes all 
the business operating in digital arena (online), selling and providing physical goods and 
services, virtual economy represents the un-real economy which only exist in a virtual 
world. However the distinction between digital currency and virtual currency became 
unclear with the introduction of a type of virtual currency, cryptocurrency.  
ii. Categorization of Virtual Currency 
Virtual currencies can be divided into categories based on their use and the way of 
operation.122 Based on their use virtual currencies divide into two groups: community 
based, e.g. World of Warcraft Gold, Amazon Coins and Microsoft Points; and universal 
virtual currencies, e.g. Bitcoin, Ethereum and WebMoney. And virtual currencies operate 
in two ways, based on a central authority or without a central authority.   
a. Community-related Virtual Currency 
Virtual communities are computer-generated environments in which the members or 
users of the community interact with each other through their virtual characters (avatars) 
and pursue one mutual goal. These worlds can be reached simultaneously by great 
amounts of individuals from anywhere in the world. Networking websites such as 
Instagram, Twitter and Facebook, chatrooms and online games like World of Warcraft 
and League of Legends are examples of a virtual domain. 
Every community related virtual currency is developed to be specific to one particular 
virtual world. These currencies can only be spent in that virtual domain through members’ 
interactions. It serves as a form of payment while the user purchases specific virtual items 
or services within the world. For instance, World of Warcraft Gold, whose subunits are 
Silver and Copper, is used as a medium of exchange within that cyberspace.  
Community related virtual currencies differ in a way on how a participant obtains it. 
While some of them can be acquired by purchasing with legal tender such as Amazon 
Coins and abolished Microsoft Points, some of them can only be obtained by carrying out 
                                                          
122 ECB has a different classification – closed, bidirectional, unidirectional. See European Central Bank (2012), “Virtual Currency 
Schemes”.  
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a particular task as it is the case for World of Warcraft Gold. However none of these 
community related virtual currencies can be converted back to legal tender.   
In their nature, all community related virtual currencies are centralized, having a single 
authority of administration. The central authority issues the currency, administers the 
transactions, determines the rules and monitors the currency flow. 
b. Universal Virtual Currency 
The use of universal currencies is not limited to a specific computer-generated world but 
they can be used to purchase real goods and services of the market. Not only one can 
obtain these universal virtual currencies with legal tender but also convert it back into a 
legal tender. They function like a real currency with its convertibility and exchange rates. 
Examples of this type are Bitcoin, being the most prominent, Ethereum and other 
“altcoins”123.  
Regarding the way of operation, universal currencies may be centralized (WebMoney) or 
decentralized (Bitcoin and Ethereum). Decentralized universal currencies are not issued 
by a central authority (put into circulation), thus not subjected to any central monitoring 
or to any rules established by a central authority. Furthermore, it cannot be withdrawn 
from circulation. These decentralized currencies are called cryptocurrencies124, 
transferred from an information system to another, for example, from computer to 
computer.  
2.  Cryptocurrency, Bitcoin and the Bitcoin Protocol 
i. Bitcoin 
Bitcoin is the first decentralized convertible virtual currency, cryptocurrency. This 
electronic cash system was designed by an anonymous individual or a group of 
individuals called Satoshi Nakamoto as a pseudo-anonymous system. The system consists 
of four innovations, a de-centralized peer-to-peer network (bitcoin protocol), a public 
transaction ledger (the Blockchain), a de-centralized mathematical currency issuance 
(distributed mining) and a de-centralized transaction verification system (transaction 
script).125  Introduction of Bitcoin was done by Satoshi Nakamoto’s self-published paper, 
                                                          
123 Bitcoin alternatives. 
124 Cryptocurrency is a medium of exchange that uses cryptography to secure transactions rather than trusted third party.  
125 Antonopoulos, A. M. (2014), “Mastering Bitcoin”. O’Reilly Media, First Edition, ISBN 978-1-449-37404-4.  
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“Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”126 in 2008 which was a response to 
financial crises of 2008 that reduced individual confidence on financial institutions 
dramatically.  
In the paper, an electronic payment system that would allow two parties to directly 
transmit value without a trusted third party, is claimed as a need based on various reasons. 
It was first argued that the sector of commerce on internet is growing and financial 
institutions remain the sole, indispensable actors of e-commerce transactions. These 
actors of non-cash transactions (electronic transactions) are unable to avoid mediating 
disputes and leading to the rise of transaction costs, to the limitation in the minimum 
amount to be transferred and to the prevention of irreversible transactions for irreversible 
goods and services. In order to overcome the weakness of the system, it proposes a 
network that is not dependent on trusted third party based on cryptographic proof127 
instead of trust.128Despite the invention of other cryptocurrencies since 2008, Bitcoin 
remained the most prominent one. 
Classification of Bitcoin’s legal status has been posing a great challenge for countries and 
regulatory bodies. While there is no unanimously decided status, classification is crucial 
for the determination of the applicable laws and regulations. There are two main 
arguments on determining the class of Bitcoin, bitcoin as a currency and bitcoin as an 
asset. Its usage is considered sometimes to be the determinative factor. If used to purchase 
or sell goods and services, Bitcoin is more similar to a currency. However if used for 
investment purposes to generate profit, it functions more like an asset. This paper does 
not aim to determine the nature of bitcoin but briefly touches upon the ongoing arguments 
on the legal status of Bitcoin. 
As mentioned previously, currency is characterized as a medium of exchange, a unit of 
account and a store of value which is designed as a legal tender that circulates in the 
country of issuance129. Real or fiat currencies are issued to be scarce that does not hold 
                                                          
126 Nakamoto, S. (2008), “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”. Retrieved from https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. [Accessed 
on 05.06.2017]. 
127 Cryptographic proof relies on private and public keys which are used in the process of transfer of value from a payor to a payee. 
These digital signatures ensure the security of the system. 
128 Nakamoto, S. (2008), “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”. pp.1. 
129 FATF (2014), “FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definition and Potential AML/CFT Risks”. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf. 
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intrinsic value. Despite the similarities of Bitcoin and real currency, it does not fulfil all 
the criteria.  
Germany considers Bitcoin as a units of account which is not expressed in the form of 
legal tender, however it does not classify it as a real currency but rather a “private 
money”.130  
Another argument has been held on whether Bitcoin can be considered as a commodity 
money such as gold and silver which are naturally scarce currencies that are not issued 
by any central authority whose value are derived from the material.131  
On 2014, Danish Central Bank stated that Bitcoin is not a currency because it does not 
have an intrinsic value compared to silver and gold.132 Its value is dependent on 
individuals and on how much they are willing to pay.  
Jurisdictions seeing bitcoins as assets based their claims on the usage of bitcoin as an 
investment tool. Norway, one of the jurisdictions that rejected to treat bitcoins as a 
currency, classifies bitcoin as a capital property.133 Jeffry Dorfman, however 
differentiates Bitcoins from other assets and classifies bitcoin as a “speculative asset”. 
Economics Professor from University of Georgia, writing in Forbes, in May 2017 claimed 
that Bitcoin is not a plausible currency or an investment tool due to its unstable value that 
changes nearly 50% months where the exchange rate between the USD and the Euro only 
changes 3% monthly. He furthermore argued that bitcoin has no underlying usage as gold 
does, usage for investment.134  
                                                          
130 CNBC, Clinch, M. (2013), “Bitcoin recognized by Germany as ‘private money’”. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnbc.com/id/100971898. [Accessed on 24.08.2017]. 
131 Baur, D. G. & Hongik, K. H. & Lee, A. D. (2015), “Bitcoin: Currency or Asset?”. Pp.3. Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2736020. [Accessed on 29.09.2017]. 
132 DENMARKS NATIONALBANK (2014), “BITCOIN ER IKKE PENGE”. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationalbanken.dk/da/presse/Documents/2014/03/PH_bitcoin.pdf#search=Bitcoin. [Accessed on 03.09.2017]. 
133 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Global Legal Monitor, Hofverberg, E. (2013), “Norway: Bitcoins Are Capital Property, Not 
Currency, Says Norwegian Tax Authority”. Retrieved from http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/norway-bitcoins-are-capital-
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134 Forbes, Dorfman, J. (2017), “Bitcoin Is An Asset, Not A Currency”. Retrieved from 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2017/05/17/bitcoin-is-an-asset-not-a-currency/#7669eb222e5b. [Accessed on 
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Figure 1. Bitcoin Volatility Over Time (%)135 
Considering all the arguments touched upon, one may easily say that, the hybrid nature 
of Bitcoin prevents authorities to decide on its legal status and remains to be an issue for 
the regulation purposes. In order to deal effectively with this issue, Canada and Australia 
adopt a hybrid approach where Bitcoin is classified as both asset and currency depending 
on specific situations.136   
Bitcoin’s market capacity, at the moment of the writing, 10th of March 2018, is 
approximately $160B (depending on the exchange rate of the day) with almost 17M 
Bitcoins in circulation. As mentioned above, there is no central authority that puts Bitcoin 
into circulation. The network creates a Bitcoin every 10 minutes (in average) and 
guarantees that supply of the Bitcoin to never exceed 21 Million (to be reached in 2140), 
where each unit can be broken into subunits. Its exchange rate varies (due to user demand) 
which may differ $500 in a 12 hours period. Since its invention, exchange rate of Bitcoin 
reached to the highest of $20,052.60 in December 2017, with the rate of $9,423.00 at the 
moment of writing. The largest Bitcoin transaction so far was 194,933 Bitcoins, worth, at 
the moment of the transaction, $150M. 
Bitcoin as a universal virtual currency, can be used to purchase physical goods and 
services, to make payments to anyone or any organization or to sell goods and services. 
In this sense one could say that Bitcoin is more of a digital currency than a virtual currency 
                                                          
135 The Bitcoin Volatility Index, Bitcoin Volatility Over Time. Retrieved from https://bitvol.info/. [Accessed on 10.03.2018]. 
136 Litwak, S. (2015), “Bitcoin: Currency or Fool’s Gold: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Classification of Bitcoin”. 29 Temp. 
Int’l & Comp. L. J., pp.345.Available online at www.heinonline.com. 
 57 
since it is used in the real world for physical goods and services. Companies or businesses 
who accepts Bitcoin as a payment method for the provided good or service, are increasing 
in number, rapidly and are expected to spread all around the world.137  
Its extra-territorial nature is one of the biggest contributor for Bitcoin becoming very 
successful along with the accelerated payments, removal of high fees and arbitrary limits 
of transfer. Neither has it required a user to possess a bank account nor to wait for the 
working hours to make a payment. The system is always open and the transactions occur 
mostly in short times.138  
The Bitcoin software is public, can be downloaded for free by anyone in the purpose of 
storing, receiving and transferring Bitcoin. As mentioned above, Bitcoins can be obtained 
against other currencies and converted back at particular exchange rates. Exchange is held 
by various exchange services with many national currencies like United States Dollar 
(USD), Euro (EUR), Swedish Krona (SEK), Turkish Lira (TL), British Pound (GBP) and 
etc. When exchanged to Bitcoins are completely virtual.  Meaning that, Bitcoins are not 
available in a physical or a digital form.  
ii. How to acquire Bitcoin? 
Being a participant in bitcoin network is easy and for free. All a user has to do is to 
download a virtual currency wallet139 to its computer, smart phone or to use an online 
version of a wallet (Coinbase, Bitcoin Wallet, Multibit). When it’s downloaded, the 
account is created without the need of an individual to disclosure any information related 
to personal identification. Participant’s identity is only linked to a Bitcoin address. 
Acquiring bitcoin/cryptocurrency is no different than buying foreign currencies from 
exchange kiosks, banks or online banking systems. Unlike foreign currencies, for Bitcoin 
a merchant should go to a special exchange office, web platform or a bitcoin ATM that 
sells cryptocurrencies. Bitstamp for European (EUR), Coinbase (coinbase.com) for USD 
                                                          
137 List of Entities accepting Bitcoin. Retrieved from https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Trade. [Accessed on 25.09.2017]. 
138 Average confirmation times for Bitcoin transactions vary due to the Blockchain transaction traffic caused by software’s limitation 
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139 Virtual currency wallet is defined by FATF as means (software application or other mechanism/medium) for holding, storing and 
transferring bitcoin or other virtual currency. See FATF (2014), “FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definition and Potential 
AML/CFT Risks”. pp.7. 
 58 
based currency market are the largest Bitcoin brokers where merchants can buy and sell 
cryptocurrencies. Depending on the national jurisdiction, cryptocurrency exchange 
offices are subjected to regulations as Know Your Client (KYC) and Customer Due 
Diligence (CDD) that has to be taken into account when buying. Depending on the 
requirements, obtaining bitcoins may take some time. 
On the other hand, there are alternative ways to acquire bitcoin such as buying it from a 
local system participant or a friend directly in exchange with cash or transfer of money. 
Furthermore, a merchant may sell a good or a service in its Brick and Mortar or online 
store for Bitcoin or altcoins.140 Additionally, by mining process, one may alternatively 
acquire Bitcoin. 
iii. Bitcoin Protocol and Blockchain  
Bitcoin, along with being the name of a cryptocurrency, is the name of a protocol, a peer-
to-peer network. Unlike the traditional banking systems, any transaction occurs between 
two information systems, from computer to computer or from smart-phone to another 
without a central authority monitoring the network.  
The system introduces a non-conventional solution for the problems that electronic 
transactions faces with: verification of the authenticity of the money and the double 
spending. Authenticity and double spending problems are dealt by central authorities who 
are given responsibility to handle all electronic transactions. However the removal of the 
authorities leads these problems to be remained. Cryptographic digital signature 
integrated with distributed computation systems serve as a solution for both of the 
problems under Bitcoin software.   
Upon the creation of a bitcoin wallet, each user is given two keys as a requirement of 
public-key cryptography141. One of them is a private key that functions as a personal 
password or a hand-writing signature and is used to authorize a transaction. The other is 
a public key, which can be shared with other users and serves as a bitcoin address. Bitcoin 
address has an encrypted structure which is a long code of letters and numbers. Even 
though it operates as an e-mail address, a user may create a new address as many time as 
                                                          
140 Antonopoulos, A. M. (2014), “Mastering Bitcoin”. O’Reilly Media, First Edition, ISBN 978-1-449-37404-4. pp.10. 
141 Brito, J. & Castillo, A. (2013), “BITCOIN A Primer for Policymakers”. MERCATUS CENTER, George Mason University, pp.5. 
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it wishes which will be connected to the user’s wallet142. With the keys assigned, a user 
can prove ownership of value, transfer value or access and control its account.  
 
Figure 2.. Public and Private Key 143 
When user X wishes to transfer bitcoins to user Y, all X has to do is to type in the bitcoin 
address of Y, enter the amount of bitcoin to be sent and to authorize the transaction by 
signing it digitally with its private key in the transfer page.  
 
Figure 3. Bitcoin Mobile Wallet- Send Bitcoin Screen 144 
                                                          
142 “A wallet is simply a collection of addresses and the keys that unlock funds within.” See Antonopoulos, A. M. (2014), “Mastering 
Bitcoin”. O’Reilly Media, First Edition, ISBN 978-1-449-37404-4. pp.9. 
143National Bitcoin ATM Helpdesk (2016), “How do I use/send the bitcoin I just bought with my receipt?”. Retrieved from 
http://help.nationalbitcoinatm.com/support/solutions/articles/6000080051-how-do-i-use-send-the-bitcoin-i-just-bought-with-my-
receipt-. [Accessed on 17.10.2017]. 
144 Antonopoulos, A. M. (2014), “Mastering Bitcoin”. O’Reilly Media, First Edition, ISBN 978-1-449-37404-4. pp.12. 
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By the public-key cryptography, verification of ownership (authenticity of the coin) can 
be proved. However it solely cannot verify if a coin is not spent doubly (double-spending 
problem). 
Blockchain technology in the core of the system solves this problem by registering every 
single Bitcoin transaction in a distributed public ledger. Every participant keeps the 
copies of their ledger. Thus everyone in the system is able to see one other’s balance. The 
maintenance of the public ledger (Blockchain) is performed by communication network 
through computers which are not under the control of any centralized entity, called 
maintainers. These high performance computers are expected to solve a sophisticated 
algorithm and reach to a math-based consensus on the true record of all previous 
transactions (chain of sequence of events). Once the chain is created by proof of work it 
is true and irreversible which is used for the next transactions to prevent double-spending 
of a coin.  
For instance, when payer X sends q amount of bitcoins to payee Y, the transaction is 
broadcasted to the whole network with attached information; bitcoin address of X and Y 
and the amount of bitcoin sent. If the transaction has a valid signature, every computer 
(maintainer) in the system updates their ledger. However, fraudulent activity or traffic in 
the system might lead to differences in the ledger.  In order to decide on the true sequence 
of events (true ledger), system requires the maintainers to vote by solving an algorithm 
based on their version of the ledger. The race between the maintainers is not for numbers 
but is to find the true sequence of data.145 There is no need to create unanimity on the true 
version of the ledger, however a consensus is needed. The more people are trying to solve 
the algorithm based on their version of the ledger, the faster the algorithm to be solved. 
Thus as long as the majority of the computers are honest and generating true entries 
regarding the sequence of events, any fraudulent activity or a mistake is dealt within the 
system.146 When a maintainer solves the mathematical problem, it announces the “true” 
version and others update their copies of the ledger accordingly.  
                                                          
145 Brito, J. & Castillo, A. (2013), “BITCOIN A Primer for Policymakers”. MERCATUS CENTER, George Mason University. pp.6. 
146Nakamoto, S. (2008), “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”. pp.5. 
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New transactions are constantly flowing into the network and every 10 minutes147 create 
a block that contains the algorithm to be solved. When the process successfully ends and 
a true ledger is announced by a participant, the block attaches to the previous blocks of 
transactions which all together creates a Blockchain. This process, called Proof-of-Work, 
happens, averagely, every 10 minutes and each solution creates a block that will be 
attached to the preceding blocks containing entire history of commerce of bitcoin 
(blockchain - public ledger - sequence of events).  
iv. Distributed Mining and Issuance of Bitcoin 
Any person may perform the responsibility of a maintainer yet, not without being 
subjected to maintenance costs which grow as more maintainers participated to the bitcoin 
network. Involvement to Proof-of-Work, solving a problem, consumes a lot of electricity 
since the computer has to work 24/7, without being turned off. On the other hand, one 
can join but cannot remain in the bitcoin network as a maintainer with a normal computer. 
Possessing a high performance machine is a necessity. Thus being a maintainer is costly. 
In order to encourage people to join the network and to contribute to the verification of 
transactions, the bitcoin network awards the participant who solves the mathematical 
problem first (verifies first), with Bitcoins. Award is given to compensate the costs of 
maintenance. Due to the issuance of bitcoin after every verification, the maintainers are 
also called bitcoin miners.  
Bitcoins are issued at a fixed and a decreasing rate. Satoshi Nakomoto declared that “total 
circulation will be 21,000,000 coins. It’ll be distributed to network nodes when they make 
blocks, with the amount cut in half every 4 years. first 4 years: 10,500,000 coins next 4 
years: 5,250,000 coins next 4 years: 2,625,000 coins next 4 years: 1,312,500 coins etc. 
…”148 While the first 4 years 50 Bitcoin was the reward of each block, the amount 
diminished to 25 Bitcoin in November 2012 and finally to 12,5 Bitcoin in 2016. 149  
As mentioned previously, the system is built to ensure that the issuance of a bitcoin will 
take place at a time that was determined in the software. If every block contained 50 
Bitcoin, then 10.500.000 coins were issued from 210.000 (4 * 365 * 144) blocks in the 
                                                          
147 Interval between blocks is not always exactly 10 minutes. While many takes less than that, some takes much more than it, with the 
average interval of 10 minutes.  
148 Satoshi Nakamoto Institute (2009), “Bitcoin v0.1 released”. Retrieved from 
http://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/emails/cryptography/16/. [Accessed on 28.09.2017]. 
149 Antonopoulos, A. M. (2014), “Mastering Bitcoin”. O’Reilly Media, First Edition, ISBN 978-1-449-37404-4. pp.178. 
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first 4 years, which makes averagely 144 blocks per day.  By looking at the equation given 
above, one can easily confirm that every block is created in 10 minutes (average) and the 
software guarantees that the interval will remain the same. 
Blockchain technology that lies under the Bitcoin network introduces a security 
technology. The Blockchain, is considered as one of the most secured systems against 
cyberattacks, since a successful attack has to be carried simultaneously from the majority 
of the computers connected to the system. Research on the applicability of Blockchain 
technology to other systems is already been carried out, some being implemented and 
some waiting in the line to be realized. Self-executing smart contracts, fraud-free voting 
systems and protection of IP rights are some of the applicable systems. Yet for the purpose 
of this paper, non-virtual currency applications of the Blockchain Technology will not be 
assessed further.   
3. Vulnerability to Risks  
Usage of virtual currencies has grew in numbers due to its easy, fast and cheap nature 
comparing with the traditional payment methods.  Along with its benefits, the system is 
not invulnerable to risks related to the users, the market and the investors.150 Risks related 
to the users are observed as losses incurring due to wallet theft, fraudulent exchanges and 
value fluctuations which were considered as the most possible scenarios to be realized151. 
On the other hand investor concern is linked mainly to the volatility of the currency. 
Market concern, maybe the most acknowledged one, is linked to risks of financial 
integrity including money laundering and terrorist financing, risk of financial crime such 
as trade of illegal commodities or ability to avoid seizure of assets and commodities and 
tax evasion.152 For the purpose of this paper, risks and regulatory measures other than 
money laundering and terrorist financing are not assessed further. 
Among all virtual currencies, cryptocurrency has the highest risk potential due to its 
pseudo-anonymous nature, decentralized network and easy international transmissibility. 
Despite its widespread usage and vulnerability to risks, it operated free from any 
regulation for a long time. However regulators took notice on the issue and incentives for 
regulation increased in order to protect the stakeholders and the market. Responses were 
                                                          
150 Vandezande, N. (2017), “Virtual currencies under EU anti-money laundering law”. Computer Law & Security Review 33, KU 
Leuven Centre for IT & IP Law, pp.342. Available online at www.sciencedirect.com. 
151 European Banking Authority (2014), “EBA Opinion on ‘virtual currencies’”. pp.21-22. 
152 European Banking Authority (2014), “EBA Opinion on ‘virtual currencies’”. pp.33-35. 
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various and distinct to these risks, while some countries opted to ban trade in virtual 
currency (China), some opted to issue licenses to the virtual currency exchangers153 (New 
York State Department of Financial Services- BitLicense), subjecting them to specific 
requirements with the purpose of reducing client anonymity.  
Action at European Union level adopted an incremental approach. Despite, the need of 
the European Regulation on virtual currency was raised for the first time in 2012, the 
European Union dealt with the issue on a theoretical level only until 2016. An amendment 
to the 4th AML Directive was proposed on June 2016 as a part of Commission Action 
Plan against terrorist financing, following the Paris terrorist attack, aiming to bring virtual 
currencies under the scope of the Directive, requiring virtual currency exchangers to 
comply with customer due diligence (CDD) and know your client (KYC) methods as it 
requires from financial institutions among others, which have not been accepted yet. 
i. Virtual Currency in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Schemes 
Virtual currencies took their place in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Schemes and Methods next to the traditional tools such as offshore banking, alternative 
underground remittance services (hwala154) and use of international wire transfers.  
a. Money Laundering 
Benefitting from Virtual Currencies for money laundering purposes could occur in two 
different ways. Firstly, dirty money obtained from illegal activities as drug trafficking, 
human-trafficking or sale of various illicit commodities, could be exchanged through a 
virtual currency exchanger into a virtual currency (placement). And criminals by 
involving into multiple transactions and purchases could obscure the origin of funds 
(layering). Funds that are distanced from their origin then could be integrated into the 
mainstream economy (integration). In the second scenario, virtual currency obtained 
through criminal activity could be converted to a fiat currency and go through the same 
layering process to distance funds from their origin.  
The first case to take public attention to the potential of virtual currency to facilitate crime 
is the Liberty Reserve case. In May 2013, a Costa Rica based online payment system that 
                                                          
153 According to the definition of FATF Report, exchanger is a person or entity engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual 
currency for real currency. 
154 Hwala is a method of transferring money without an actual movement, done through Hwala brokers. See Part I. 
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issued its own centralized virtual currency (Liberty Reserve Dollars/Euros backed by real 
dollars or euros) was prosecuted by US authorities with the charges of laundering $8B by 
more than 50 million transactions combined of credit card and identity theft.155 The 
system was allowing criminals to make financial activity on Liberty Reserve in a 
completely anonymous way. Customers were asked to provide names and addresses, 
however none of them were obliged to verify the information given with official 
documents. Hence the transactions were untraceable. Completely anonymous and 
untraceable transactions were the source of attention of criminals.  
Silk Road was the name of another case brought by the U.S. authorities. Silk Road was 
an online market known for selling illegal commodities including drugs, armament, stolen 
credit card numbers, fake licenses and passports156. It was providing its customers a 
monitoring free and an anonymous browsing by requiring payments to be made by 
Bitcoin and by limiting the accession of the website which could be only done through 
an anonymizing network, Tor157. From its creation in 2011 until its seizure in 2013, the 
website operated without legal enforcement due to its method of operation.158 When the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shut down the website and convicted Ross 
Ulbricht, the founder of Silk Road, of money laundering, computer hacking and drug 
trafficking crimes, the reputation of virtual currency and Bitcoin being contributors of 
crime began to be acknowledged by the media and regulators. 
b. Funding of Terrorism 
Virtual currencies as a threat for counter terrorism efforts were dealt with different 
responses. While the National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment of the U.S. considers 
virtual currencies as a potential threat to financing of terrorism159, the European Banking 
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Authority considers Virtual Currency remittance systems as a high risk development for 
the efforts against funding of terrorism.160  
According to the report of CNAS of 2017, virtual currencies became a threat recently for 
counter-terrorism measures due to its regulatory challenges161. They have not been used 
in a large scale yet, but authorities should not ignore the risks and should bring virtual 
currencies under law enforcement.162  
Unlike the money laundering cases, reports of terrorism funding by virtual currencies 
remains anecdotal.163 There are reports from various intelligence services and 
governmental authorities containing information that terrorist groups in Gaza have been 
using Bitcoin to fund their activities, while some other reports claim that various Bitcoin 
wallets were found to be owned by Daesh militants. Recently, Bitcoin and terrorism link 
was claimed by the Indonesian government in January 2017. Indonesian authorities 
declared that they have evidence on Daesh operatives, using Bitcoin to transfer money to 
other operatives. One of the names appeared in reports, Bahrun Naim is an Indonesian 
operative of Islamic State, who is claimed to be the person behind the Jakarta attack of 
2016.164However as mentioned above, there are no official evidence proving that 
terrorists have been using virtual currencies to fund their activities. 
Incidents and intelligence reports mentioned above proved once again the need to regulate 
virtual currency in order to mitigate the risks related to money laundering and financing 
of terrorism. Various countries proposed different solutions as European Union member 
states adopted diversified initiatives. For the purpose of this thesis, only European Union 
level AML/CFT regulations will be introduced and assessed with a critical approach.  
In order to assess existing regulations, to highlight its inadequate and sufficient points 
and, if needed, to propose an effective regulation, characteristics of cryptocurrencies that 
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makes them attractive to be used for money laundering and as a tool for global terrorist 
funding are addressed first.  
ii. Characteristics Related to AML/CFT Abuses  
a. Anonymity 
Great deal of anonymity provided by the Bitcoin network to its users is one of the reasons 
why Bitcoin is linked to money laundering and terrorist financing, why criminals are 
encouraged to use and why media and regulators are giving a great deal of attention to it. 
Despite the fact that sales through anonymous digital wallet enables launderers to conceal 
the origins of illegally obtained money and hardens the surveillance of the money flow, 
anonymity of bitcoin transaction is a widely misunderstood concept. In order to eliminate 
the misunderstanding, the paper compares two existing system of transaction with the 
cryptocurrency transactions, PayPal165 or traditional electronic transfers and payment 
with cash. 
When an individual wishes to create a bank account, since mediating party is involved, 
she/he is subjected to disclosure of personal information that identifies the user. 
Therefore, whenever the account holder transfers money electronically to another account 
holder, identity of the payer and the payee appears in the system and transaction is 
recorded in the ledger. Likewise, payments done through PayPal, since a user’s PayPal 
account is attached to their bank account, are fully transparent as the financial institution 
monitors the flow of money between its two system participants. On the other hand, 
payments done with cash are completely anonymous, whereby there is no institution 
(mediating party) to witness or supervise the transaction. Transactions through Bitcoin 
network are different than the realities mentioned above and yet carries some of their 
characteristics. 
As mentioned above, a person is not required to disclosure his/her identity or any other 
information when obtaining a bitcoin account, unlike creating a bank account through 
financial institutions. Hence, the system provides privacy to its users. The public key 
given to the user is not attributable to any specific individual or to any personal 
information. Neither a third party nor the payee can know the identity of the payer or the 
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identity of the payee. Thus, like in the transaction scenario of cash, identity of the payer 
and the payee are also anonymous in a bitcoin transaction.  
Bitcoin differs from cash and appears to be more similar to traditional electronic 
transactions due to the transparency of bitcoin addresses. All transactions of a bitcoin 
address, from the first ever bitcoin transaction to the last, are recorded in the public ledger. 
Hence, one can look to the public ledger (Blockchain) and see all transactions associated 
with the particular bitcoin address, the public key.166 Publicly shared ledger makes these 
payments pseudo-anonymous rather than completely anonymous as cash payments.  
However, upgrading personal security for the usage of cryptocurrency is possible through 
cryptocurrency mixing services/tumblers such as Helix, Bitcoin Blender and Ethereum 
Mixer. These services offer protection of privacy by mixing funds with others to hide 
where cryptocurrency came from originally and clean user’s coin (layering phase). These 
systems function similar as one moves its funds through financial institutions located in 
countries that have strict bank secrecy laws such as Panama, Philippines, Cayman Islands 
and Curacao.167 
 
Figure 4. Helix Mixer – Cleaning Screen168 
So one can easily say that, permitting some level of anonymity and existence of 
cryptocurrency mixing services or tumblers to upgrade user anonymity makes 
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cryptocurrency, including bitcoin, highly desirable for money launderers, terrorists and 
others who carry out illegal schemes (criminal activities). 
b. Easy, Cheap, Fast and Irrevocable International Transmissibility 
Another reason why bitcoin is perceived as a potential money laundering and terrorist 
financing tool is linked with its cheap, quick and easy international transmissibility. A 
transaction is permitted to be sent from any place to anywhere, at any time and in any 
amount. For instance, a person located in Country A may initiate a transaction through an 
online exchanger located in Country B in order to acquire cryptocurrency with the 
national currency of Country C. Obtained cryptocurrency can be transmitted to a receiver 
located in Country D. Receiver may convert his/her cryptocurrency to the fiat currency 
of Country E, through an exchanger in Country F.  
Additionally, while the costs of international transaction are much lower for peer-to-peer 
network than fees required trusted third parties (financial institutions), its transfer is 
completed within minutes instead of waiting for days. Moreover, surveillance of a 
transaction by financial institutions is not possible, so there is no authority to report and 
stop a suspicious transaction that contains abnormal money flow or to require a 
registration of cross-border transactions exceeding certain value threshold. Cash 
transactions are also characterized by being irreversible. Once made, there is no way it to 
be reversed by a financial institution or the user. But there is one factor that makes bitcoin 
an ideal payment method comparing with cash, which is the complexity of carrying large 
amounts of cash around the world. 169  It is too weighty and burdensome to transfer large 
amounts of money without the attention of authorities. Cryptocurrency, on the other hand, 
has no physical existence as a coin or a banknote. It faces with no transfer obstacle. 
c. Non-centralized Institutions  
Cryptocurrencies are popular due to their de-centralized nature. They are not backed by 
any public or private authority. Thus there is no central institution for monitoring 
purposes. Traditionally what hardens operations of money launderers, terrorists or 
persons who are involved in illegal activities, is the control mechanism carried out by the 
financial institutions through a system that allows transactions and group actions to be 
tracked. By carrying out due diligence, know your client mechanisms and reporting 
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suspicious transactions those institutions ensure the functionality of AML/CFT and 
mitigate the risks. Yet, in a peer-to-peer electronic transaction network, there is no central 
institution to ensure a functioning AML/CFT mechanism.  
Up to a certain level, exchangers may operate as a control mechanism. They can subject 
their clients to CDD and minimize the anonymity of a user. Nonetheless, exchangers can 
never fully function as financial institutions since international transactions of 
cryptocurrency take place without any central channel, where the value is not transmitted 
through exchangers. In their case observing a transaction, not to mention reporting a 
suspicious transaction, will be impossible. Considering all the factors highlighted above, 
it is obvious to understand why criminals are attracted to this system.   
Despite all the captivating features for money launderers and terrorist financers that are 
highlighted above, bitcoin has setbacks which limits its usefulness. These unattractive 
features are: unpredictable changes in the value of cryptocurrency, volatility of the 
currency, potential cryptocurrency wallet theft, failure to convert fiat currency to 
cryptocurrency or vice versa due to supply, demand and cost issues and rising regulatory 
awareness.170
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1. The European Union Takes a Notice 
Identified risks related to the anonymity and decentralized nature of the virtual currency 
and its tendency to be used by criminals to conceal the source of the illegal gains raised 
concerns of regulators all over the world. Jurisdictions adopted different approaches to 
mitigate the risks related to the trade and usage of the decentralized virtual currency.  
The European Union followed an approach in which the issues related to virtual currency 
was treated at the theoretical level only, from 2012 to 2016 when the Commission 
presented a draft regulation amending the Fourth AML/CFT Directive in connection with 
the reveal of Panama Papers and the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.  
At the European Union level the first report to be released on virtual currency was held 
by the European Central Bank on 2012171, followed by the second report in 2015172. The 
aim of the first report was to conduct a research on virtual currency to create an 
understanding of the new reality and to pave the way for further discussion. The second 
report conducted a more detailed study on the examination of virtual currency, its 
disadvantages in general as well as the advantages over traditional payment systems.173 
In this recent report it seemed that the ECB was still questioning whether a regulation 
was needed or not, by arguing that the usage of virtual currency as a payment method is 
still very limited, thus the risks it poses to the banking operations are not materialized yet. 
The warning for the first time at the EU level, though, came from the European Banking 
Authority on 2013, whose objective is regulated in Article 1 (5) of the Regulation 
establishing the EBA as “to protect the public interest by contributing to the short, 
medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the Union 
economy, its citizens and businesses.”174 The EBA published a document named as 
“Warning for the consumers on virtual currency”175 to raise the awareness of the risks 
related to the buying, holding and trading in virtual currencies, giving specific attention 
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to the new generation virtual currencies, cryptocurrency. The warning invited consumers 
to be cautious when being a part of the Bitcoin system by taking their attention to its high 
volatility, vulnerability to attacks, tendency to be used for criminal activities and the lack 
of protection that could be offered from any authority.  
A comprehensive report was released by the EBA on 2014 which identified economic 
and individual benefits as well as various risks related to the users, non-user market 
participants, financial integrity, payment systems and payment service providers in FCs 
and regulatory authorities. Unlike the ECB reports, the EBA embraced the urgency of a 
regulation by arguing that some risks have already been materialised176 and recommended 
a possible long and short term regulatory approach taking into consideration the risks 
drivers. Until a more comprehensive regulatory regime is adopted, the report 
recommended that “the national supervisory authorities discourage credit institutions, 
payment institutions, and e-money institutions from buying, holding or selling VCs, 
thereby ‘shielding’ regulated financial services from VCs”177 and the virtual currency 
exchangers to be subjected to AML/CFT requirements as obliged entities under anti-
money laundering and counter terrorist financing laws.178  
For a consistent and a successful legislation European Banking Authority highlighted the 
need of a harmonized response at the EU level by putting forward the disadvantages of a 
segregated legislation due to the peer-to-peer nature and the international transmissibility 
of the virtual currency.  It furthermore justified its argument by expressing that the non-
coordination would lead to different regimes and eventually to forum shopping for the 
most favourable approach.179  
Following the terrorist attacks in Paris at the fall of 2015, the European Commission 
highlighted the need for European Union to work on policies to fight against terrorism 
and to prevent the movement of funds to be used for used for terrorist activities. Financial 
and technological innovations were stressed out to be the reason for the need of a policy 
update.  As a consequence of this need and the reveal of the Panama Papers, the European 
Commission adopted an “Action Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of 
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179 European Banking Authority (2014), “EBA Opinion on ‘virtual currencies’”. pp.46. 
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terrorism”180 in order to prevent and fight terrorism181. The gaps identified were: cash and 
trade in artefacts, virtual currency and the anonymous pre-paid cards.182 In the 
Communication, the Commission not only recommended various actions to be taken 
under existing laws but also recommended a legislative proposal to amend Fourth AML 
Directive in the points of: “enhanced due diligence measures/countermeasures with 
regards to high risk thirds countries; virtual currency exchange platforms; prepaid 
instruments; centralised bank and payment account registers or electronic data retrieval 
systems, the access of Financial Intelligence Units to, and exchange of, information.”183 
In the Action Plan, the Commission acknowledges the fact that the virtual currencies are 
not regulated currently under the EU law, thus there is no authority to monitor and control 
the suspicious transactions.184 Furthermore, the real issue related to virtual currency was 
found to be its nature of anonymity.185 Hence, the Commission proposed in the Action 
Plan “to bring anonymous currency exchanges under the competent authorities by 
extending the scope of the AMLD to include virtual currency exchange platforms, and 
have them supervised under Anti-Money Laundering/ countering terrorist financing 
legislation at national level”186. With the amendment, the users of the virtual currency 
would be subjected to due diligence requirements whenever they wish to exchange their 
virtual currency for “fiat currency”, and vice versa, through the exchange platforms and 
deduce the level of anonymity related to virtual currency transactions. Application of the 
                                                          
180 European Commission (2016), “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action 
Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism”. Retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e6e0de37-ca7c-11e5-a4b5-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. [Accessed on 
31.10.2017]. 
181 European Commission (2016), “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action 
Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism”. pp.2.  
182 European Commission (2016), “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action 
Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism”.  
183 European Commission (2016), “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action 
Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism”. pp.9. 
184 European Commission (2016), “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action 
Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism”. pp.3. 
185 “New financial tools such as virtual currencies create new challenges in terms of combatting terrorist financing. Highly versatile 
criminals are quick to switch to new channels if existing ones become too risky. For innovative financial tools, it is critical to be able 
to manage the risks relating to their anonymity, such as for virtual currencies. Critical to this question is less the forms of payment 
themselves, but rather whether they can be used anonymously.“ See European Commission (2016), “Communication From the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of 
terrorism”.pp.3. 
186 European Commission (2016), “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action 
Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism”. pp.5. 
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rules under the Payment Services Directive related to licensing and supervision to the 
virtual currency exchange platforms was considered by the Commission as a policy 
option to be assessed further along with the regulation of the virtual currency “wallet 
providers”.187 The Commission presented its proposal for “amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC”188 on July of 
2016.  
Recently, on February 2016, the European Parliament’s Committee on the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs issued a draft report on virtual currencies189. The Committee adapted a 
neutral approach when examining the virtual currency and the Blockchain Technology. 
The report exhibited that the Committee is willing to consider the new ideas and is 
unprejudiced against the widespread usage of both virtual currency and distributed ledger 
technology. 
The report by touching upon many factors created a deep understanding of the virtual 
currencies as well as the Blockchain technology (Distributed Ledger Technology - DTL) 
that lies under the Bitcoin system. The draft report stressed that the virtual currency 
comparing with the traditional online payment systems is indeed cheaper, faster and 
provides high degree of privacy but does not operates without vulnerabilities related to 
the pseudo-anonymity190, the existence of mixing services, lack of safeguards for 
consumers and lack of legal certainty.191 Furthermore, high exchange rate volatility, 
expensive operational costs of the virtual currencies due to the consumption of electricity 
were indicated in the report as the disadvantages. The consumers and the Member States 
were informed with the objective of raising awareness.  
                                                          
187 European Commission (2016), “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action 
Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism”. pp.5. 
188 European Commission (2016), “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending 
Directive 2009/101/EC”. 
189 European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2016), “Report on virtual currencies (2016/2007(INI))”. 
Retrieved fromt http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2016-
0168+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. [Accessed on 31.10.2017].  
190 Creating tendency to be used on the black market, for money laundering, tax evasion and for financing of terrorism. 
191 European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2016), “Report on virtual currencies (2016/2007(INI))”. 
pp.6. 
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Along with the comprehensive information regarding the disadvantages, the report 
stressed the potential benefits of the utilization of distributed ledger technology not only 
in the context of virtual currency but also of financial technology and beyond such as 
smart contracts and the registration of intellectual property rights. The report encouraged 
the investment in Distributed Ledger Technology for the optimization of various day to 
day operations at the financial192 and governmental services. The draft report 
recommended a possible regulation193, which in one hand accommodates the further 
innovation and avoid any “pre-emptive and heavy-handed regulation that would stifle 
growth”194. On the other hand it suggested regulators to develop sufficient laws to respond 
the risks before they become systemic195.  
The ECON report welcomed the European Commission’s Action Plan to amend the 
Fourth AML Directive to bring the virtual currencies under AML/CFT laws scope and to 
render virtual currency exchange providers “obliged entities”, in ending the anonymity 
associated with the virtual currency operations.196 The ECON did not only considered the 
need of an amendment of the AML laws of the EU but recommended to the Commission 
to assess the all possible risks related to the virtual currency and accordingly to revise 
other relevant legislations when needed, including the Electronic Money Directive 
(EMD), Payment Services Directive (PSD) and the Payment Accounts Directive 
(PAD).197 Furthermore, the ECON report called for the creation of a task force (TF DLT) 
consisting of experts to further investigate virtual currency and to revise existing 
European regulation if found necessary to tackle with the challenges.198 
                                                          
192 BNP Paribas is exploring the private use of Blockchain Distributed Ledger Technology since 2016 in order to make the sharing of 
collateral valuation (involving manual reconciliation for the unsecured transactions involving multiple parties) less complex and less-
time consuming. See BNP Paribas (2017), “CO-CREATION, CLIENTS AND BLOCKCHAIN: MYCOLLAT”. Retrieved from 
https://cib.bnpparibas.com/adapt/co-creation-clients-and-blockchain-mycollat_a-2-1041.html. [Accessed on 27.01.2017]. 
193 The report suggested a smart regulation towards fostering innovation and safeguarding integrity. See European Parliament, 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2016), “Report on virtual currencies (2016/2007(INI))”, pp.8. 
194 European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2016), “Report on virtual currencies (2016/2007(INI))”. 
pp.8. 
195 European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2016), “Report on virtual currencies (2016/2007(INI))”. 
pp.9 
196European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2016), “Report on virtual currencies (2016/2007(INI))”. 
pp.8. 
197 European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2016), “Report on virtual currencies (2016/2007(INI))”. 
pp.8. 
198 European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2016), “Report on virtual currencies (2016/2007(INI))”. 
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In addition to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on the 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) presented its opinion on virtual 
currencies199 for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs to consider as a 
responsible committee, in April 2016. In the report, the Committee highlighted the need 
of an effective regulatory responses by recognizing the risks related to virtual currencies 
in relation to criminal activities as financial crimes (tax fraud, tax evasion, financing of 
terrorism, etc.) which does not prevent further innovation due to the benefits that it may 
offer in the future.200 IMCO asked Commission to “develop a coherent and 
comprehensive strategy at EU level”201 and to consider the revision of the Fourth AML 
Directive202.  
Considering the different approaches mentioned above, one may easily conclude that the 
European Parliament has been cautious in approaching the virtual currencies. On one 
hand, it highlights the need of regulation keeping in mind the risks, and on the other hand 
by acknowledging the economic and technological benefits offered by the virtual 
currencies, the Parliament has been recommending smart policies.  
2. National Responses to Virtual Currency in the EU 
The usage of virtual currencies, particularly Bitcoin as a math-based, decentralized virtual 
currency (cryptocurrency), grew in numbers and still has been growing. It attracted 
thousands for various and differentiated reasons and became a widespread phenomenon 
despite the bad reputation that it gained starting from the reveal of the Silk Road and 
Bitcoin’s involvement in it as the facilitator of money laundering and drug trafficking. 
Despite some that think that the “virtual currencies are the wave of the future for payment 
systems”203, for many the Bitcoin remained associated with the criminals or “sanction 
evaders to move and store illicit funds, out of the reach of law enforcement and other 
                                                          
199 European Parliament, Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (2016), “OPINION on virtual currencies 
(2016/2007(INI))”. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
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(2016/2007(INI))”. pp. 3-5. 
201 European Parliament, Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (2016), “OPINION on virtual currencies 
(2016/2007(INI))”.pp.4. 
202 European Parliament, Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (2016), “OPINION on virtual currencies 
(2016/2007(INI))”.pp.5. 
203 FATF (2014), “FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definition and Potential AML/CFT Risks”. pp.3.  
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authorities”204. The prosecution of the case in New York State and other cases that 
followed the first one, took attention of the regulators all over the world and signalled the 
need of a proper legislation. 
Regulating a decade old technology is not easy. Drafting a regulation requires expertise 
in the subject matter. All the relevant aspects of the technology should be worked on and 
understood well in order to set forward a legislation that both recognizes and responds to 
the risks and does not put limitations to the benefits that this technology would offer in 
the future. This was the case that the regulators faced with when revising the relevant 
laws in line with new challenges. In this case the challenge was a decentralized and 
pseudo-anonymous virtual currency, Bitcoin.  
The first issue as mentioned in the previous chapter was the determination of the legal 
status of Bitcoin. For many, it did not fulfil the requirements of being neither a currency 
nor a money. Lack of legal status created complexities in regulating the subject matter 
and differences between the national laws. While the EU, as a regional body, did not set 
forward a harmonized response towards the virtual currencies until the Commission 
proposal amending the Fourth AML Directive and solely published opinions aiming to 
raise awareness of the users and the national authorities, different Member States of the 
EU followed different methods in responding the issue.205 The differences in approaches 
raised from the differences in the legal and institutional framework and the interpretation 
differences.206 While some Member States solely gave a warnings about Bitcoin in 
reference to EBA warnings such as UK, Malta and Slovenia, some subjected the Bitcoin 
exchanges to specific requirements such as France, Germany and Sweden by consulting 
the EBA, ECB and FATF reports and opinions on virtual currency.207  
In order to show the variety, the paper draws attention to the responses of Germany, 
France and Spain to Bitcoin/virtual currency below.208  
                                                          
204 FATF (2014), “FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definition and Potential AML/CFT Risks”. pp.3.  
205 Responses are mainly directed to Bitcoin due to its prominent status among other virtual currencies as a decentralized, pseudo-
anonymous cryptoccurency. 
206 Lexology, WH Partners (2017), “Virtual currencies in Malta. The brave new world Bitcoin”. Retrieved from  
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3627fc49-6219-4fce-92bc-4ddc42efb9e7. [Accessed on 06.01.2018].  
207 European Central Bank (2015), “Virtual Currency Schemes – A Further Analysis”.pp.34-37.   
208 Country Specific responses can be found in European Central Bank (2012), “Virtual Currency Schemes”, pp.34-37. 
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i. Germany  
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) of Germany, under the consumer 
protection matter, released a warning document “Bitcoins: Aufsichtliche Bewertung und 
Risiken für Nutzer” (Bitcoins: Supervisory assessment and risks to users) in December 
2013209, providing a comprehensive assessment of the Bitcoin for the public. The 
attention is given to Bitcoin, however the publication explicitly indicates that the article 
is applicable to other decentralized virtual currencies as well.  
In order to supervise the exchanges of Bitcoin, BaFin classifies Bitcoin as a unit of 
account that does not hold a legal tender conforming with the German Banking Act 
(Kreditwesengesetz- KWG) section 1 (11).210 It is explicitly stated that the Bitcoin differs 
from e-money which is regulated under “German Payment Services Supervision Act” 
(Zahlungsdiensteaufsichtsgesetz- ZAG) since there is no authority that issues Bitcoin 
unlike e-money.211 By the German Law, Bitcoin is considered as a private money that 
functions as a means of payment in private transactions. Thus the debt cannot be paid by 
Bitcoin unless the debtor and the creditor agrees on using Bitcoin as the means of 
payment. 
According to BaFin, the buying, selling, mining and usage of Bitcoin is not subjected to 
authorization and a license is not required for these activities to be carried out. However, 
BaFin also specifies particular circumstances in which the authorization might be asked 
from the seller, miner, buyer or the users. Authorization requirement applies in situations 
“where it is not only the case that BTC are mined, purchased or sold to participate in an 
existing market but in addition a special contribution is paid to create or preserve such 
market”212. One of those situations occurs when a market participant buys, sells and mines 
Bitcoin for merely commercial purposes in which the economic advantages arise for a 
third party. That market participant is considered as a broker under the German Law and 
is subjected to an authorization to operate. Other participants that are subjected to an 
                                                          
209 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (2014), “Bitcoins: Supervisory assesment and risks to users”. Retrieved from 
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2014/fa_bj_1401_bitcoins_en.html. [Accessed on 
21.01.2018]. 
210 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (2014), “Bitcoins: Supervisory assesment and risks to users”. pp.2.  
211 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (2014), “Bitcoins: Supervisory assesment and risks to users”. pp.2. 
212 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (2014), “Bitcoins: Supervisory assesment and risks to users”. pp.3. 
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authorization are the participants who buys or sells Bitcoin in exchange of fiat currencies 
(broking and proprietary trading) and who operates a multilateral trading platform.213 
ii. France 
The French Banking Federation organized a working group to work on virtual currencies 
in June 2014 in order to recommend policy options to prevent the usage of virtual 
currencies for fraudulent purposes and money laundering.214 The working paper was a 
warning for the users, highlighting the sources of risks namely the presence of 
unregulated participants, lack of transparency and extraterritoriality.    
The lack of legal classification of Bitcoin refrains it both from being treated under the 
existing laws and from being regulated. Yet, there are no French laws regulating virtual 
currency. However, according to the French Banking Federation (FBF) revenues of the 
sales of Bitcoins through a bank account may require the bank to file a declaration to the 
French anti-money laundering agency.215 
iii. Spain  
Virtual currencies are not classified as legal currency under the Spanish laws due to their 
decentralized nature.216 The legal definition of Bitcoin in Spain was put forward by Pablo 
Fernández Burgueño in its Article called “12 Cosas Deberías saber antes de usar Bitcoins 
(Le ley y el Bitcoin)”217 , “12 Things You Should Know Before Using Bitcoins (Law and 
Bitcoin)”. According to the article “A Bitcoin is an intangible digital asset, functions as a 
unit of account created by and transferred through a computer system which cannot be 
copied”218.  
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Under Spanish laws, virtual currency is not regulated. However a judgment of Provincial 
Court of Asturias219 of 2015 raised the question of whether the sale and exchange of 
Bitcoins was subjected to the AML legislation220 of Spain.  
The case includes Meetpays, a service provider for buying Bitcoins with credit cards, and 
Caja Laboral, a credit institution. After entering into an affiliation agreement to systems 
of Mastercard and Visa which included the installation of Point of Sale (POS)221, 
Meetpays sued Caja Laboral for not fulfilling its contractual obligations. The defendant 
argued that the POS operation was never activated thus the contract never became 
effective due to the fact that it could not guarantee the requirements of diligence since the 
payments could be done in Bitcoin, anonymously, without being subjected to any fees, 
worldwide and without the disclosure of the source of funds. Article 16 of the Law 
10/2010 was referred in the judgment which obliges financial institutions to draw 
attention to risks of money laundering related to new technologies and services allowing 
anonymity.222  
The court furthermore referred to the Article 7.3 of the Spanish AML Act stating that “the 
cases in which the obliged entities cannot guarantee the measures of diligence under the 
law, they have the right to not establish a business relationship or may terminate the 
execution of the operation”. Upon the referral, the court dismissed the claims of the 
plaintiff and decided in favour of the defendant, Caja Laboral. 
What can be said about the Spanish AML Law is that, it does not regulate the virtual 
currency or oblige virtual currency exchanger to comply with AML laws regarding the 
KYC and CDD measures explicitly. However, it indirectly by the Article 16 of the Law 
10/2010 obliges entities to take necessary measures to carry out due diligence. Hence, the 
virtual currency falls under the scope of Spanish AML Act.  
                                                          
219 LAW & BITCOIN (2015), “Judgement of the Court of Asturias. Judgment No: 00037/2015”. Retrieved from 
http://lawandbitcoin.com/en/judgment-of-the-provincial-court-of-asturias/. [Accessed on 07.01.2018].  
220 Ley 10/2010, de 28 de abril, de prevención del blanqueo de capitales y de la financiación del terrorismo. Available online at 
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221“A point of sale system encompasses the hardware, software, and support that manage that transaction, including credit card 
processing, and the post-transaction operations that lead to customer fulfillment, whether in a retail or restaurant setting.” Available 
at https://pos.toasttab.com/what-is-pos.  
222 LAW & BITCOIN (2015), “Bitcoin and Anti-Money Laundering Part I”. Retrieved from http://lawandbitcoin.com/en/bitcoin-and-
anti-money-laundering-part-i/. [Accessed on 05.02.2018]. 
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Examples given above regarding the differences in legal frameworks and actions taken 
towards virtual currency/Bitcoin put forward the current situation of the virtual currency 
in EU. The regime is not harmonized at the EU level which creates disadvantages for the 
anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism policies of the EU. The lack of 
a harmonized action and differences in the national regimes create insufficiencies in 
accomplishing the objectives of preventing the usage of virtual currencies for fraudulent 
purposes and money laundering. The current situation prevents the large scale success of 
the policies and renders the national actions inadequate due to the international 
transmissibility of the virtual currency. Furthermore, it leads criminals to the “virtual 
currency industry shopping”223, where they benefit from the most favourable regulation, 
create different levels of protection for the system participants and differences in the 
liabilities of the legal persons.  
Therefore, for the achievement of the objectives; mitigation of financial crimes and 
fraudulent activities and the protection of the system participants, internal market and the 
financial stability, an action at the EU level is crucial and necessary. To establish a 
minimum level of combating mechanisms through criminal law and a harmonized regime 
at the EU level, the Commission proposed to amend the Fourth AML/CFT Directive in 
2016. Haven’t been accepted yet, its adequacy to tackle with the money laundering and 
financing of terrorism risks related to virtual currency, particularly cryptocurrency, is 
questionable. The next section is dedicated to the changes brought to the Fourth AML 
Directive in regards to virtual currency. The clauses added to the Directive are assessed 
in order to answer the main question of this paper; whether the proposal provides 
sufficient combating mechanisms against the risks related to virtual currency or not. The 
evaluation is done by taking the characteristics of cryptocurrency giving rise to the risks 
into account.  
3. Commission Proposal to Amend 4th AML/CFT Directive and Virtual 
Currency 
As a conclusion of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of November 2015, the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council of December 2017, the European Council of 
December 2015 and as the part of the Action Plan to strengthen the fight against financing 
of terrorism, the Commission revised Anti-Money Laundering rules and proposed an 
                                                          
223European Banking Authority (2014), “EBA Opinion on ‘virtual currencies’”. pp.46.  
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amendment of the Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending 
Directive 2009/101/EC on July 2016.224 
The revision was drafted in line with the recommendations of the European institutions 
such as EBA, ECB and ECOFIN Council, as well as the international policy guidance 
published by the Financial Action Task Force to form an international standard and to fill 
the gaps in the existing regimes to tackle with the new challenges introduced by the 
advances in technology and communications that blurs the transparency of financial 
transactions. In the explanatory memorandum of the proposal, it is indicated that the 
primary objective of the revision is to “prevent the large-scale concealment of funds 
which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced 
corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal 
arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities.”225 
The proposal is drafted in compliance with the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity regulated in Article 5 of the TFEU, the personal data protection laws of the 
EU; Directive (EU) 2016/680226 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679227. Fundamental rights 
particularly the right to private and family life set out in Article 7, the protection of 
personal data set out in Article 8 and the freedom to conduct business set out in Article 
16 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights are recognized in accordance with the Article 
6(1)228 of the TEU.  
                                                          
224 European Commission (2016), “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 
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Directive 2009/101/EC”.pp.3. 
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2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending 
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data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC”. General Data Protection Regulation. 
228 Article 6(1) of the TEU states that “The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal 
value as the Treaties.” 
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Points that were amended in the proposal in regards to the virtual currencies are as 
follows: 
Article 1 (1) of the Proposal amends the Directive (EU) 2015/849 Article 2(1), regulating 
the obliged entities whom are subjected to specific requirements under the Directive. The 
scope of the obliged entities who are natural or legal persons acting in the exercise of 
their professional activities (point 3 of Article 2(1)) was extended to include point (g) and 
(h) to cover exchange platforms of the virtual currency and the wallet providers offering 
custodial services. The matter is regulated as the following: “(g) providers engaged 
primarily and professionally in exchange services between virtual and fiat currencies; (h) 
wallet offering custodial services of credentials necessary to access virtual currencies.”229  
By the inclusion of the custodial wallet providers and the virtual currency exchange 
platforms to the obliged entities, the system participants who buy or sell their virtual 
currencies through these service providers are rendered to disclose their identity through 
Know Your Client and are subjected to due diligence measures regulated in Chapter II 
Section 1,2 and 3. The sale, purchase and usage of the virtual currencies can be monitored 
by the competent authorities which would increase transparency in the transactions of 
virtual currency. Extending the scope of the Directive makes virtual currency exchange 
platforms and custodial service providers the gatekeepers of the Anti-money laundering 
and counter financing of terrorism laws, as well as the authority who controls the access 
to virtual currency. 
The circumstances in which the due diligence is required to be carried out is set out in 
Article 11 of the Fourth AML Directive. In regards to these service providers, the 
circumstances are as the following; “(a) when establishing a business relationship; (b) 
when carrying out an occasional transaction that amounts EUR 15000 or more, constitutes 
a transfer of funds exceeding EUR 1000; (c) in the case of persons trading in goods, when 
carrying out occasional transactions in cash amounting to EUR 10 000 or more; (e) when 
there is a suspicion of money laundering and terrorist financing, regardless of any 
derogation, exemption or threshold; and (f) where there are doubts about the veracity or 
adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.”230 
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Another change to be brought to the Fourth AML Directive is within Article 3 setting out 
the definitions to apply for the purpose of the Directive. Point (18) is added to define 
virtual currencies with the purpose of reducing complexities in defining virtual currency 
and consequently adopting measures tailored for the characteristics of virtual currency.  
According to Article 3 (18) of the proposal “ ‘virtual currencies’ means a digital 
representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank of a public authority, nor 
necessarily attached to a fiat currency, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a 
means of payment and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically.”231 In this regard 
the definition of the virtual currency may seem to carry similarities with the German Law 
regulating Bitcoin like a ‘private money’. It functions as a means of payment as long as 
the parties involved, natural or legal persons accept it as one.   
The proposed amendment to the Fourth AML Directive requires virtual currency 
exchange providers and custodian wallet providers to be licensed or registered, which is 
set out in Article 1, point 16 of the proposal. Article 47(1) is replaced by the following 
clause; “Member States shall ensure that providers of exchanging services between 
virtual currencies and fiat currencies, custodian wallet providers, currency exchange and 
cheque cashing offices, and trust or company service providers are licensed or registered, 
and that providers of gambling services are regulated.”232 This is a complementary clause 
in achieving the control over exchange services providers and the custodian wallet 
services and ensuring that they will oblige with the requirements set out in the Directive. 
Additionally, registration of these platforms allows authorities to monitor transactions of 
virtual currency. Business licenses of virtual currency are regulated and issued by some 
jurisdictions already. One of the first licenses granted was by the New York State 
Department of Financial Services. Being issued in New York State, the license only 
covers those platforms operating in that area. The law prohibits exchange platforms who 
does not hold business license to operate.233  
The changes mentioned above are the clauses which directly regulates virtual currency to 
mitigate the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks. There are clauses that are 
                                                          
231 Article 1(2). 
232 Article 1(16).  
233 New York State Department of Financial Services, New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (2015), “Title 23. Department of 
Financial Services, Chapter I. Regulations of the Superintendent of Financial Sevices Part 200. Virtual Currencies”.pp.7. Retrieved 
from https://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp200t.pdf. [Accessed on 10.08.2017]. 
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indirectly linked to virtual currency, exchange service and custodial wallet providers. 
According to Article 1(11) section (a) and (b) of the proposal, Article 32 of the Fourth 
AML Directive is amended. Section (a) adds a paragraph 9 to the Article 32 stating that 
“In the context of its functions, each FIU shall be able to obtain from any obliged entity 
information…”234 In this regard, the reporting and the monitoring agency for the virtual 
currency exchange providers and the custodial wallet providers are determined as 
Financial Intelligence Units, as it is for the financial institutions. Pursuant to Article 33 
of the Directive (EU) 2015/849, those platforms related to virtual currency are obliged to 
monitor transactions and to carry out necessary investigations to understand the nature of 
the transaction and if found suspicious, to make a suspicious activity report (SAR) to the 
FIU of the member state, “on their own initiative”235 or by “request”236.  
By analysing the changes to be brought to the Fourth AMLD in relation to virtual 
currencies, we can observe that the proposal offers set of rules that are promising, as it 
takes steps towards the characteristics of cryptocurrencies giving rise to AML risks. A 
detailed argument on the measures and their effect will be carried below. 
4. Analysis of the Proposal 
We can conclude by analysing the responses given by the European Union that even 
though virtual currency was given attention to before, terrorist attacks along with the 
concerns on tax evasion following the offshore scandals alarmed European Commission 
towards virtual currencies that are facilitating criminal activities through anonymous 
transactions.237 And here, as it has been the case since 1980, the AML law was forced 
once again to evolve to be responsive towards new challenges. This time for the virtual 
currencies. 
It is possible to say that bringing virtual currency exchange platforms and the custodial 
wallet providers under the due diligence and know your client requirements will 
contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this proposal which are obtaining 
                                                          
234 Article 1 (11) (a). 
235 Article 33(1) (a) of Directive (EU) 2015/849. 
236 Article 33 (1) (b) of Directive (EU) 2015/849. 
237 BITCOIN MAGAZINE (2016), “EU State-By-State Regulation of Bitcoin, Digital Currencies: What Are the Implications?”. 
Retrieved from https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/eu-state-by-state-regulation-what-are-the-implications-1480975527/. [Accessed 
on 07.01.2018]. 
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transparency in the transfer of funds, mitigating the anonymity of the system participants 
and monitoring the virtual currency transactions. 
The argument takes place below, where 3 characteristics of virtual currency, more 
specifically cryptocurrency will be assessed in the light of the proposal.  
i. Anonymity 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, pseudo-anonymity is one of the major factor why 
the criminals are attracted to cryptocurrencies. Non-disclosure of the identity works too 
well for the criminals and ease their operation. Naturally, regulators gave full attention to 
tackle with the anonymous nature of the cryptocurrencies. Subjecting virtual currency 
exchange providers and custodial wallet providers to CDD and KYC requirements will 
help to de-anonymize the users who are trading Bitcoin for a fiat currency and vice versa 
and whose wallets are under the custody of an agency (custodial wallet provider). Thus, 
if the proposal is adopted, whenever an individual wishes to obtain cryptocurrency 
through an exchange service platform, he/she will be subjected to some requirements 
pursuant to of the Directive. These providers would know their clients through the 
information collected and they will be able to observe the activities of their clients. The 
same will apply for the users who keep their cryptocurrency in a custodial wallet where 
the BTC, or any other cryptocurrency is held by an agency on the user’s behalf.238 
Consequently, as the AML/CFT system requires, there will be now a trusted third party, 
an intermediary for a virtual currency transaction serving like an informant.  
Throughout their operations, they will have to report suspicious transactions, the 
abnormal flow of funds, to the FIUs. However, the factors which render a transaction 
abnormal or suspicious are unclear.  
Virtual currency is relatively a new phenomenon and the transaction patterns are still 
unknown. Therefore, a comprehensive study should be done in order to understand what 
is considered as a normal transfer of fund and what is not to help exchange service and 
custodial wallet providers who are mostly start-ups. The factor of determination of 
suspicion could be in geographical basis. Jurisdictions considered as high-risk countries 
by law could be the focal point of the investigations. By this, anytime a fund flows 
through a high-risk country the system could alert the authorities and be subjected to a 
                                                          
238 Coinsutra (2017), “Bitcoin Wallter: Everything a Beginner Needs to know”. Retrieved from https://coinsutra.com/bitcoin-wallet/. 
[Accessed on 09.01.2018]. 
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thorough investigation. Another factor could be in threshold basis determined in line with 
the profile of the client. If the client excesses the threshold and cannot prove the rationale 
behind it, these entities would report it to FIUs. If these remain imprecise, FIUs would be 
overwhelmed by the amount of the suspicious reports delivered by the exchangers, and 
left in a position where they cannot distinguish false and true hits. 
After the elaboration done above, it is not unusual to say at this point that the proposal 
would not achieve its objectives to its fullest due to various factors. First of all, it misses 
the point that the exchangers are not the only means to obtain virtual currency. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, users have other options in obtaining virtual currency 
in exchange of cash (from a local system participant or a friend) or through mining. These 
alternative ways are as easy as going to a Bitcoin ATM or to an exchanger. And maybe 
even simpler and faster if the proposal is to be adopted, since no information is required 
to be disclosed. Within such an exchange, the third trusted party or the intermediary 
would not be present to function as a financial service. And the AML/CFT Directive will 
still be not applicable to those circumstances.  
Another limitation of the amendment arises from the definition of the exchange services. 
The exchange services covered by the proposal are the “providers engaged primarily and 
professionally in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies”239, 
obviously it does not cover the exchange services between virtual currencies and other 
virtual currencies, for instance Ethereum to Bitcoin and vice a versa. Consequently, once 
again the new Directive will be in short to eliminate anonymous nature of the virtual 
currency transactions within this context.  
Wallets contains private keys240 of the particular virtual currency address. The user may 
choose “a wallet based on connectivity241, the custodianship of keys242 and wallets related 
to a specific device243”244. Custodial wallet providers, covered by the proposal, are the 
agencies who hold the private keys of the BTC address and exchange on the behalf of the 
true owner of that currency. According to the proposal, these agencies will have to subject 
their customers to CDD requirements. They will be obliged to know the identity of the 
                                                          
239 Article 1 (1) of the Proposal.  
240 Antonopoulos, A. M. (2014), “Mastering Bitcoin”. O’Reilly Media, First Edition, ISBN 978-1-449-37404-4.pp.84. 
241 Wallets based on connectivity are divided into two types, online and offline wallets. 
242 Custodial and non-custodial wallets depending on whether the user is responsible for its own funds or not.  
243 Device related wallets are the hardware wallets, mobile wallets, desktop wallets and the web wallets. 
244 Coinsutra (2017), “Bitcoin Wallet: Everything a Beginner Needs to know”. 
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user and understand their business operations and patterns. As the exchange providers, 
these entities will be obliged to report to the FIUs whenever they have a reasonable 
ground to suspect that the transaction is held to benefit a criminal activity.  
Until this point, it seems that the virtual currency will be compatible with the AML/CFT 
laws, since a gatekeeper is restored within the system. But one should not ignore wallets 
that are taken care by their true owners, the beneficial owners of the account. For those 
cases, a trusted third party is not present as it was not before the proposal to amend Fourth 
AMLD. Therefore there no trusted third party to identify the user, monitor, investigate 
and report the suspicious transactions. And, yet the proposal will not sufficiently 
eliminate risks related to anonymity for the wallet users who take the responsibility of 
their own wallets.  
It is highlighted above that the proposal will help to de-anonymize only the users who 
exchange their virtual currency with fiat currency and vice a versa.  While it is always 
questionable how accurate and reliable the information collected would be, the 
availability of the mixing services/tumbler should not be forgotten. These services offer 
protection of privacy by mixing funds with others to obscure the origin of funds and clean 
the coin of the user. Because of the availability of such methods, no matter how detailed, 
up to date, accurate and reliable the KYC documentation is, the user would still be able 
to circumvent CDD through these services. 
On the other hand, as long as there are jurisdictions that do not regulate cryptocurrency 
and no limitation is put on the international transmissibility of the coin, criminals could 
just simply acquire cryptocurrency against fiat currency, or the other way around, in other 
jurisdictions and use it within EU for the purposes of laundering money or finance 
terrorism.  
The last but not the least, all the measures set forward by the AML/CFT laws regarding 
the virtual currency, efforts to de-anonymize cryptocurrency users, would be inapplicable 
and obsolete if the usage of Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency becomes widespread. 
Even though it is unlikely for the close future, there is a great possibility that virtual 
currency will be the future of the traditional payment systems. In such scenario, no one 
would feel the need to go to an exchange platform to acquire cash against virtual currency 
simply because they can buy and sell goods and services in exchange of a decentralized 
virtual currency. Under these circumstances, the money launderers and the financers of 
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terrorism would be freed from going through KYC and CDD and carry out their operation 
in ease. Naturally, this payment system would still be a threat for many jurisdictions who 
are incapable of inserting a trusted third party for virtual currency transactions.  
To introduce a more effective and an efficient solution for the de-anonymization process 
the European Commission seems to consider establishing a mandatory database for the 
virtual currency holders to self-declare to the authorities245 -changing the possible plan 
for a self-declaration system on a voluntary basis246 as stated in the proposal. However, 
even the regulator “forces” users of the de-centralized virtual currency, like Bitcoin, no 
one can actually be enforced to do so since there is no authority having control over the 
de-centralized system. And without such control, it is too naive to believe that such 
measure actually would pay off. There is no doubt that in the event of money laundering 
and terrorism financing, such registry would contribute to the AML/CFT policy but it is 
way too utopic to believe that a criminal would actually register to this database. 
ii. Easy, Cheap, Fast and Irrevocable International Transmissibility 
Another reason why Bitcoin is perceived as a potential money laundering and financing 
of terrorism tool is because of its comparative advantage against the traditional payment 
systems relating to its speed, the amount of transaction fees and the international 
transmissibility which is supported by the Bitcoin Protocol. While the proposal may seem 
to be incapable to have a direct effect on those characteristics247, it is true that it actually 
may influence.  
Virtual currency exchange platforms subjected to AML/CFT responsibilities, like 
financial institutions, will find themselves in a situation where the law compliance will 
be too burdensome due to the costs248. No one can be sure but there is a great change for 
those compliance and administration costs, rising up dramatically, to find a reflection on 
the transaction fees put on the customers.  
On the other hand, since the on-boarding of a client has to be compatible with the law and 
all necessary documentation should to be obtained from the customer speed of obtaining 
                                                          
245 Paraskevopoulos, I. (2017), “THE THREAT OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES SYSTEMS AND 
BITCOIN TRANSACTIONS”. International Helleniic University, School of Economics, Business Administration&Legal 
Studies.pp44. 
246 Recital 7 of the Proposal.  
247 Unless the Bitcoin protocol is changed. 
248 Gathering information, record-keeping, risk assesment, suspicious activity reporting and etc. 
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cryptocurrency and/or transferring would be affected. Consequently, the comparative 
advantage of cryptocurrencies would be gradually diminished and some users would be 
discouraged by the rising costs, slowed and hardened transactions. However these 
repercussions are still not enough for such currencies to disappear. As long as Bitcoin-
like-coins are internationally transmissible and decentralized, there is no regulation that 
can stop users to benefit from the exchange service platforms in other jurisdictions who 
operate without being obliged to comply with any regulation. Unless a protocol change 
is accomplished, those characteristics cannot be altered by anyone or any law. 
As mentioned before, peer-to-peer transaction network is similar with the transactions 
held by cash due to the fact that payments are irrevocable. In the case of wire transfers, 
fund flowing from or flowing to a suspicious entity would alert the financial institutions 
and may result in the confiscation of assets generated by criminal activities, which is an 
important tool to prevent and fight with crime that deprives criminal from its profits. If 
proceeds of crime is identified and traced in the traditional electronic transaction 
networks, pursuant to the Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of 
instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union249 member states are given 
rights and tools for the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime.250 However, 
transactions carried through a decentralized peer-to-peer networks are irrevocable and the 
nature of Bitcoin makes seizure impossible. 
A way, a possibility of confiscation of Bitcoin was mentioned in the FBI released Article 
“Virtual Currency: Investigative Challenges and Opportunities”251. According to the 
article seizure of Bitcoin could be done through gaining access to the user’s wallet which 
can be kept “on a laptop, thumb drive, or server”252 as well as on a paper wallet. The 
paper argues furthermore that prosecutors may use the asset forfeiture laws to seize 
                                                          
249 European Union (2014), “Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing 
and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union”. Retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0042#ntr4-L_2014127EN.01003901-E0004. [Accessed on 
23.01.2018]. 
250 Currently there is a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on mutual recognition of freezing and 
confiscation orders. Available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0819. 
251 Coin Telegraph, Cohen, B. (2015), “Governments Seize the Opportunity to Control Bitcoin”. Retrieved from 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/governments-seize-the-opportunity-to-control-bitcoin. [Accessed on 12.09.2017]. 
252 FBI, LEB, Nigh B. & Pelker A. (2015), “Virtual Currency. Investigative Challenges and Opportunities”. Retrieved from  
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/virtual-currency-investigative-challenges-and-opportunities. [Accessed on 18.10.2017]. 
 93 
Bitcoin as a proceeds of crime. However, existence of back-up wallets and volatility of 
Bitcoin makes the procedure problematic as long as the Bitcoin system remains the same.  
iii. Non-centralized Institutions 
The Bitcoin protocol and the Ethereum Protocol using consensus to regulate transactions 
and to prevent double-spending ensure the decentralization of the software.253 If any 
individual or a governmental body wishes to shut down all the system, freeze and 
confıscate the funds that are suspected, it is simply impossible since there is no centralized 
server.254 
In the contemporary systems, money moves and the transaction is concluded only if the 
permission has been given by the financial institution. The system in its nature limits the 
individual by dictating it to have a bank account and to use a specific fiat currency if 
he/she wishes to participate to the financial system. On the other hand, peer-to-peer 
electronic transaction system based on the Blockchain technology gives the society a 
chance to opt out for the utilization of a centralized service, which is why so many people 
are interested in this innovation and perceives it as the beginning of a new era for 
electronic transactions.  
Whether the proposal introduces any measures in order to implement a central authority 
of control and management or not is a question whose answer is already given above. In 
a Blockchain based, a peer-to-peer transaction network, there is no central institution to 
ensure a functioning AML/CFT mechanism no matter how stringent the obligations are 
for the intermediaries, if intermediaries exist. Therefore, no regulation would be good 
enough to tackle with such technical aspect unless a protocol change is accomplished.  
 
                                                          
253 Gencer, A. E. & Basu, S. & Eyal, I. & van Renese, R.& Sirer, E. G. (2018) “Decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum 
Networks”.pp.2. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.03998.pdf. [Accessed on 01.02.28018].  
254 While decentralization is ensured by the system, it is true that the mining pools where the miners work cooperatively and share the 
reward, consititute a threat to the decentralization of the system. Especially due to the fact that the top 4 mining pools control more 
than %50 of the computing power of the whole system. See Kaspersky, Malanov, A. (2017), “Six Myths about blockchaion and 
Bitcoin: Debunking the efectiveness of the technology”. Available online at https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/bitcoin-blockchain-
issues/18019/. 
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5. A Possible Long-term Solution 
It is clear that the proposal, if to be adopted, will mitigate the risks at some level due to 
its focus on de-anonymization. However it does not stand as a long-term solution for the 
problem as it cannot sufficiently tackle with the characteristics attributable to risks.  
The most prominent cryptocurrency, which is at the moment is Bitcoin, may lose its 
attention which it has been getting from all over the world and consequently its value. 
Even so, certainly there will be more to come in the future as it benefits the users by low 
transaction fees, no requirement to hold a bank account, giving independency and privacy 
in transactions. Moreover, because of the technology behind the Bitcoin network, the 
Blockchain Technology, since it introduces a secure system allowing further innovation 
in many areas such as self-executing smart contracts, fraud-free voting systems, 
protection of IP rights and collateral management. Regulators should give full attention 
to the utilization of the benefits that this technology may present. Accordingly they should 
not simply ban cryptocurrencies worldwide or implement too stringent rules which would 
discourage further innovation. On the other hand, they should endorse vulnerability of 
the system to risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism and take steps 
to prevent and fight against possible criminal usage on the basis of an overriding public 
interest in restoring financial and territorial security. Taking negative and positive aspects 
of virtual currencies into account, legislations should be drafted in a way that balances 
promotion of technology and prevention of criminal usage.  
While the European Commission’s short-term solution stands, the need of a 
comprehensive long-term solution remains problematic. However, utilization of 
Blockchain technology to end anonymity and to bring transparency to the system could 
be the answer. 
The possibility of an AML compliant protocol was argued by Gunnar Nordseth Signicat 
in his article, “Will regulation be a blessing or a blow for Bitcoin?”255. According to the 
article, issue of anonymity could be tackled by using the technology behind Bitcoin itself. 
“The answer might lie with the Blockchain itself: a distributed ledger would enable 
                                                          
255 Bankingtech, Signicat, G. N. (2016), “Will regulation be a blessing or a blow for Bitcoin?”. Retrieved from 
http://www.bankingtech.com/2016/04/will-the-4th-aml-directive-be-a-blessing-or-a-blow-for-bitcoin/. [Accessed on 15.02.2018]. 
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identity to be built up based on individual ID credentials – their driving license, bank 
account, government ID, and so on.”256 
Without going technical in the subject matter, what is suggested is a replacement of 
Bitcoin platform with a new software, also called hard fork protocol change257. In hard 
forks the software simply creates a fork in the Blockchain and splits the previous version 
of the public ledger from the newest version.258 Implementation of codes (AML-
compliant codes) in this new Bitcoin protocol or creation of AML compliant protocols 
for new virtual currencies could restore the thrusted third parties and give them the 
authority to monitor, control, investigate and report all transactions within that 
Blockchain. 
Within the new system whenever the system receives a new participant through the 
issuance of addresses (public and private keys), the third trusted party would carry KYC 
and CDD, requiring all the documentation needed for identification of the users and 
his/her risk profile. Identities and identifying information would be encoded in the system 
therefore would allow authorities to investigate a transaction whenever that address 
receives or sends funds.  
It is necessary for the new software to recognize abnormal patterns of transactions. In 
traditional systems a computer-based software carries out risk assessment in line with 
encoded patterns of abnormality and indicators of suspicion (threshold, watch-list, 
geographical identifiers). “Pattern recognition software searches millions of bank, 
brokerage and insurance accounts and review trillions of dollars’ worth of transactions 
each day”259 To that end, indicators such as threshold, based on the client profile, 
geographical identifiers and watch lists should be encoded within the new protocol which 
would allow the system to automatically warn the authorities whenever a threshold is 
excessed and/or a high risk country client, PEPs, known criminals or terrorists are 
involved in the transaction. Thanks to the encoded identities and documentation gathered 
in on-boarding (attribution of public and private keys) of the system participant, the 
                                                          
256 Bankingtech, Signicat, G. N. (2016), “Will regulation be a blessing or a blow for Bitcoin?”. 
257 Ethereum went through a protocol change (hard fork protocol change) after DOA drained tokens. By the hard fork, transaction 
which drained tokens could be reversed. See Coindesk, Siegel, D. (2016) “Understanding The DAO Attack”. Available online at 
https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/. 
258Investopedia, “Hard Fork”. Retrieved from https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hard-fork.asp. [Accessed on 08.02.2018].  
259 Romney, M. B. & John, P. & Mula, J. M. & McNamara, R. P. & Trevor, T. (2013), “Accounting Information Systems”. First 
adaptation Edition, Pearson, pp.354. 
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responsible person could easily carry out investigation in the basis of risk-based approach 
and report the suspicious activity to the FIUs. Pursuant to Fourth AML/CFT Directive, 
FIUs would be able to require information from any obliged entity (in this case, it would 
be the third trusted party inserted through hard fork protocol change) for the purpose of 
the prevention the usage of the system for criminal purposes.  
Freezing and confiscation of funds is an essential concept in AML and CFT policies, if 
irrevocability of the transactions is kept in the protocol, rendering criminal businesses 
unprofitable could not be achieved and consequently further activities could not be 
discouraged. To that end, an AML-compliant protocol change should contain a feature 
which allows FIUs to stop a transaction and freeze and confiscate criminal assets when is 
necessary to do so.  
Possible solution argued above is conflicting with the rationale and ideology behind the 
creation of peer-to-peer electronic transaction systems as the Bitcoin Protocol, without a 
doubt. It takes away the right to privacy of the user and make them dependent on the 
system which was proved to be vulnerable by the Financial Banking Crises of 2008.  
However, if virtual currency is to be regulated fully and is to coexist with AML/CFT 
laws, a hard-fork protocol change for the transformation and creation of AML-compliant 
protocols seem to be the only solution for now, if to be achieved for every single 
cryptocurrency, considering the fact that there are more than 1000 cryptocurrencies in 
existence and more to come.260
                                                          
260 The Motley Fool, Frankel, M. (2018), “Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Ripple are just the beginning”. Retrived from 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/03/16/how-many-cryptocurrencies-are-there.aspx. [Accesed on 16.03.2018]. 
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Conclusion 
Anti-money laundering laws emerged as a tool to cope with transnational narco-
trafficking evolved throughout time due to social, economic and political concerns of the 
era respectively to deal with organized crime and terrorism. Regulatory bodies, 
international and regional organizations formed international standards to criminalize and 
prevent money laundering that undermines financial stability, regional and international 
economy as well as security. This thesis addressed the need of a change in AML/CFT 
regulations for the purpose of responding to technological developments undermining the 
current laws, facilitating criminals to conceal the origins of illegal gains and hide behind 
the emerging technology.  
Revision of laws was proposed to be made by acknowledging the distinct characteristics 
of virtual currency attributable to criminal activities such as decentralized nature, 
international transmissibility and pseudo-anonymity, as well as the technology behind 
virtual currency and its possible non-bitcoin applications that would benefit day-to-day 
activities of financial institutions and intellectual property rights.  
In order to answer whether the current AML/CFT laws of the European Union adequately 
deal with virtual currency or not, this thesis analysed the characteristics of cryptocurrency 
attributable to the money laundering and terrorism financing offences and examined the 
Commission proposal amending the Fourth AMLD in the light of those characteristics 
with the purpose of answering the main research question “Is current AML/CFT Law of 
the European Union adequate in dealing with virtual currency?”.  
It was concluded that the proposal to amend Fourth AML Directive remains short in 
mitigating the AML/CFT risks posed by centralized, pseudo-anonymous nature of 
cryptocurrency, as well as its international transmissibility. It was argued that even though 
the amending directive seeks to de-anonymize system participants it does not introduce a 
sufficient and a comprehensive mechanism as it ignores alternative ways of acquiring 
cryptocurrency, the existence of mixing services, non-custodial wallet users and the 
possibility to spend cryptocurrency in real life purchases.   
Finally, even though the possibility of achieving for all cryptocurrencies in existence and 
for the ones to come is questionable, a hard-fork protocol change is proposed as a possible 
solution to make virtual currency AML-compliant.
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